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ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses the institutional setup in the market for NBA players to
test important hypotheses about how the labor market functions. Sports markets
provide an ideal setting to study economic phenomena because of the wealth of
publicly available information on productivity and compensation.
In Chapter one, I analyze the effort incentives created by the existence of
long-term contracts that guarantee players a wage irrespective of performance. I
use a panel of all NBA players from 1999 to 2007 to show that player performance
improves as the expiration date of the current contract draws nearer. Players
perform ten percent better in the last year of their contract than in the
penultimate one, an effect attributable to their interest in gaining a new contract.
Despite the adverse effort incentives, teams may still prefer to sign players to
multi-period contracts because risk-averse players are willing to accept lower
salaries in return for greater security.
In Chapter two, I use the fact that the NBA draft provides us with a
quasi-natural experiment to analyze the impact of peers on player productivity
and earnings. Using information for first round draft picks for a fourteen-year
vi
span I find that better teammates have a negative but statistically insignificant
effect, on player performance. Teammate quality has a statistically and
economically significant adverse impact on player wages. Thus the market appears
to penalize players for having better teammates.
I focus on the NBA’s push to raise the minimum age of entry into the
league in Chapter three. This phenomenon seems surprising since one naturally
expects employers to encourage and entrenched workers to discourage entry of new
workers into the labor market, as this should push wages down. I construct a
three-period theoretical model in which the surplus accruing to teams can be
higher when entry is restricted, even if the average productivity of NBA players
declines. In our setting this outcome is driven by the existence of a fixed wage for
rookies, which implies that the rents extracted from new entrants increase when
entry is restricted.
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1CHAPTER ONE
Moral Hazard in Long-Term Guaranteed Contracts:
Theory and Evidence from the NBA1
1.1 Introduction
When complete contracts are written (i.e., when contracts specify a menu
of payments contingent on documentable levels of effort or performance), longer
contracts must Pareto dominate shorter contracts. When markets must rely on
incomplete contracts, however, the length of the contract has crucial implications
for agents’ performance during the contract. When contracts are incomplete and
either cannot or do not rely on performance bonuses, firms must rely on the
inherent incentives that workers have to perform well in order to obtain the best
possible terms in subsequent contracts. In the case of incomplete contracting,
long-term contracts will undermine that incentive since the disutility of effort is
borne by the worker immediately, while any benefits only begin to accrue at the
time of recontracting.
The presence of moral hazard in incomplete contracts suggests that
employers will prefer short-term contracts in settings where the length of the
contract is part of the negotiation. Labor markets, however, are rife with examples
of firms and workers agreeing to incomplete contracts that stipulate a guaranteed
wage for a specified multi-year duration. For instance, contracts for junior
academic faculty often include a guaranteed salary throughout a standard length
of service. In several European countries, the only lawful alternative to
non-permanent hiring is a ”fixed-term” contract that specifies guaranteed payment
over a negotiated duration. This type of fixed-term contract is similar to those
1This chapter is the product of joint work with Brad Rice, of Analysis Group.
2signed by many professional team-sport athletes. At the end of these contracts,
individuals are evaluated for reappointment and a new contract is negotiated.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of optimal contract length that
draws on the inherent trade-off between the incentive effects of short-term
contracts and risk aversion. The model shows that while career concerns moderate
moral hazard, long-term contracts do contain adverse effort incentives. When
firms and workers can bargain over wages, however, risk aversion ensures that
workers gain by having long-term contracts. Because workers are willing to make
wage concessions, firms can benefit since long-term contracts provide a cheaper
way to hire workers. Our results hold without the inclusion of any explicit notion
of re-contracting costs. The model weds the most salient features of the literature
on career concerns (e.g., Holmstro¨m 1982, 1999; and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and
Tirole 1999) with the relevant literature from long-term contract theory (e.g.,
Holmstro¨m 1983; Cantor 1988; Fudenberg, Holmstro¨m, and Milgrom 1990;
Fudenberg and Tirole 1990) to find conditions under which long-term contracts
Pareto-dominate short-term contracts. The optimal contract length does not
always cover multiple periods. Adjusting the parameters in the model helps
explain the intraindustry heterogeneity in contract length which oftentimes occurs.
The focus of the empirical section of the paper is to quantify the change in
effort incentives within a long-term deal, controlling for confounding factors. To
do so, we focus on the agency relationship between National Basketball
Association (NBA) players and team ownership. We have compiled a unique
dataset containing information on 654 NBA players, their contractual terms,
annual performance across several dimensions, information on team performance,
and physical characteristics.
Historically, testing for moral hazard in labor markets has proved difficult
3in practice. As a result, our paper contributes to a literature with limited
empirical evidence. The primary reason for this scarcity of evidence is that the
data requirements for such tests are restrictive. At a minimum, the researcher
must observe micro-level worker performance and contractual terms. Because of
the public nature of the data, a relatively large proportion of the work testing the
effort implications of contract structures analyzes the agency relationship in
sports.2 The bulk of this literature, however, studies Major League Baseball,
whose contracts tend to include more individual incentives and bonuses than
professional basketball contracts (see Lehn [1990] for an example or Kahn [2000]
for a review of this literature). In addition, because contractual terms are not
distributed randomly across workers, and inherent ability is imperfectly measured,
it is difficult to disentangle the output effects due to ability and the output effects
due to effort. The important feature of our data is that we observe each player for
an average of 2 contracts, varying from 1 to 12 years in length. Because over 90%
of the individuals in our data are observed in multiple years we are able to control
for unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity. The data set we utilize is over
four times larger, includes more individuals, more observations per individual, and
more data on individual characteristics than any other comparable study. In
addition, this paper appears to be the first of its kind to quantify the continuous,
within-contract path of effort.
We find strong evidence that the effort of NBA players increases
monotonically as their contracts near completion—a pattern that can be explained
2There is a literature on testing for moral hazard in labor markets outside of sports, however.
For instance, Lazear (2000) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) perform a test for moral hazard in
the labor market under different payment schemes. In addition, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
test the empirical implications of the career concerns literature applied to chief executives.
While they do not address the moral hazard effects of contracts specifically, they test for
differences in contractual structures designed to combat moral hazard.
4by our model of contracting. Fixed-effects estimates indicate that effort-related
performance (as measured by the NBA efficiency score, which combines several
performance statistics into a single index) in the final year of a multi-year deal is
approximately 8% higher than in the year prior. Moreover, our point estimates
indicate that effort is a non-linear function of the number of years until contract
renewal, with performance in the third-to-last year of a contract falling only an
additional 4%, and with no statistically significant differences in effort when a
player has four or more years remaining in his contract. Estimating the model via
OLS without player fixed-effects fails to find any adverse effort incentives
associated with long-term contracts, implying that unobserved heterogeneity is an
important source of bias.
1.2 Theory
We start our theoretical framework by setting up a three-period
principal-agent model. The model derives three central predictions,
1. effort increases from one period to the next within a multi-period guaranteed
contract,
2. cumulative effort generated within a multi-period contract falls short of the
effort levels elicited by a series of single-period contracts, and
3. in spite of this ‘shirking,’ the multi-period guaranteed contract may be
Pareto efficient.
The potential efficiency of multi-period contracts is driven by the risk
aversion of the agents. Since output in our model is partially determined by a
random component, risk aversion motivates the agent to offer wage concessions in
5exchange for a pre-specified wage, guaranteed over a longer period of time.
Multi-period contracts enable the worker to face less income risk.
Overall, career concerns ensure that the agent does put in a positive level
of effort (except in the last contract) and that problems of shirking are mitigated.
The optimal contract in this framework, however, must weigh the risk smoothing
advantages of multi-period contracts with their adverse incentives, much like in
Zeckhauser’s (1970) classic paper on medical insurance.
The market consists of two players: one principal and one agent. Output
produced in period t, yt, is a stochastic function of the agent’s exogenously
determined ability, a, and effort, et ∈ R+, according to the production function
yt = a+ et + zt. Ability is initially unknown to the principal and the agent, but
both share a common prior belief that it is drawn from a normal distribution with
mean µ, variance σ2a, and a precision parameter defined as ha =
1
σ2a
. The stochastic
production element, zt, is independent of a, normally distributed, and i.i.d. with
zero mean, variance σ2z , and precision hz =
1
σ2z
. The cost to the agent of exerting
effort is described by a convex cost function, c(et) = e
2
t .
The agent’s total utility in any period t as a function of wage, wt, and level
of effort exerted, et, is given by U(wt)− e2t . As opposed to most career concerns
models, the agent is assumed averse to unexpected income shocks so that the
utility that he derives from a monetary reward follows a CARA functional form,
Ut = − 1α exp−αwt. The parameter α is the agent’s coefficient of constant absolute
risk aversion. There is no borrowing or lending, i.e. the agent must consume wt in
period t. The principal’s payoff is determined by the profit function yt − wt.
We assume that for any length of contract, τ , there is an associated
exogenous profit sharing rule, κτ ∈ [0, 1] such that wt = κτEy¯, with Ey¯
representing the average (discounted) expected output within a contract. We
6interpret this profit share as the result of a bargaining process between the
principal and agent. Since a lifetime contract is an uninteresting option in this
model (reasons given later), this means that there will be one or two-period
contracts. When the principal is part of a perfectly competitive market, κτ = 1.
There are a couple of noteworthy simplifications in the nature of our
contract design. First, we specify wages as a fraction of expected average output
throughout the contract instead of just expected output that period. For
one-period contracts, this assumption simply implies that wage is a fraction of the
expected output in the period. Two period contracts are a little more complicated.
Because the agent is risk averse, the principal is risk neutral and because the wage
doesn’t have incentive effects during the contract (i.e., incentive effects of a wage
are only in terms of efforts in earlier contracts), the only sensible thing to do is to
have the marginal utility of wage constant over the two periods. But given this,
the agent has greater insurance in a two period contract than in a one period
contract. Hence, the agent will prefer the two-period contract with a marginally
lower κ to two one-period contracts. It’s natural to expect that the introduction of
bargaining or a more explicit model of competition will have the result that agents
with a two period contract will necessarily ”give up something” in exchange, so
that a lower κ is what we would expect to see. This paper takes κ to be exogenous
for simplicity, but this argument suggests that if it were endogenous, the result
would have the same implication that we find below, namely, that κ depends on
the length of the contract with a smaller κ for longer contracts.
Though the true ability of the agent is unobservable, the market is able to
obtain progressively more precise estimates by observing a series of yt − e∗t , in
which e∗t is the the amount of effort that the principal expects the agent to exert
in period t. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the principal correctly anticipates
7the chosen level of effort, hence there is never any information asymmetry. A
series of realizations {ys − e∗s}t−1s=1 = {a+ zt}t−1s=1 gives rise to a normal posterior
distribution of a with the following means and precisions:
µ1 =
µha + hz(y1 − e∗1)
ha + hz
ha1 = ha + hz
after period one, and
µ2 =
µha + hz(y1 − e∗1 + y2 − e∗2)
ha + 2hz
ha2 = ha + 2hz
after period 2 has transpired. The market uses this updated belief of ability as its
basis to predict future output and wages.
With this setup, we compare the results of two possible contract structures.
In the first case, we consider an agent who signs a two-period contract followed by
a one-period contract—a multi-period contract case. We then consider a scenario
in which the agent signs three one-period contracts.
The aim of this exercise is to generate three theoretical predictions that
can be tested empirically, as mentioned above: effort within a multi-period
contract is not constant, aggregate effort in a multi-period contract is less than
that elicited from multiple single-period contracts, and to prove the existence of
an optimal multi-period contract. We are not attempting to make a qualitative
distinction as to which type of multi-period contact is optimal. For instance, we
omit from this analysis the case of the principal and agent agreeing to a lifetime
8contract (τ=3). Of course, while such a contract may be Pareto preferred if the
agent is sufficiently risk averse, the contract would elicit zero effort in every
period. Similarly, we forgo analyzing the case of a one-period contract followed by
a two-period contract. While the principal and agent may agree to a two-period
contract at the start of period 2, this multi-period contract would again have the
implication of zero effort in periods 2 and 3. The particular multi-period contract
analyzed allows for meaningful comparisons of the optimal effort decisions with
the single-period contractual scenario.
Since effort in period t may differ according to changes in current and past
contractual terms, let superscripts on effort, eit, and wages, w
i
t denote effort and
wage in period t. The superscript i = {M,S} denotes the multi-period versus
single-period contract case, respectively (e.g., eS2 denotes second-period effort in
the scenario of three single-period contracts). In addition, to call attention to the
information on which the agent bases his effort choice, we denote EX as taking
expectations over the random variable(s) X.
1.2.1 Case 1: Multi-period Contracts
Given the contract structure, the agent chooses effort to maximize lifetime
utility. Since first and second-period wages are fixed, the utility from these wages
is known at the time of signing the contract. Because effort in period t will be an
optimal response to the entire history of the game, second-period effort will
depend on first-period outcomes. Likewise, third-period effort will depend on the
outcomes of both periods 1 and 2 though, in this case, it is equal to zero for all y1
and y2. The agent’s maximization problem is
9max
eM1 ,e
M
2 (·),eM3 (·)
U(wM1 )−
(
eM1
)2
+REy1
(
U(wM2 )−
(
eM2 (y1)
)2)
+
R2Ey1,y2
(
U3(w
M
3 (y1, y2))−
(
eM3 (y1, y2)
)2)
in which R ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor common to both the principal and agent.
The first-order conditions
eM1 =
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂e11
+
R
2
∂Ey1e
M
2 (y1)
∂e11
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2e
M
3 (y1)
∂e11
(1.1)
eM2 (y1) =
R
2
∂Ey2U3
∂eM2
+
R
2
∂Ey2e
M
3 (y1, y2)
∂eM2
eM3 (y1, y2) = 0
indicate that the agent is behaving optimally in setting the marginal benefit equal
to the marginal cost of effort. Even though effort will not affect second-period
wages, output (and thereby effort) will affect wages in period 3, since the principal
and agent will renegotiate a third-period contract taking into account the
observed performance in periods 1 and 2.
The agent chooses effort to maximize utility taking the principal’s beliefs
on effort as given. Any marginal increase (decrease) in effort beyond those beliefs
will lead the principal to think that the agent is of relatively high (low) ability
when the time comes to renegotiate a new contract. The principal does not
observe the agent’s effort directly, but he is able to guess it by solving the same
maximization problem above. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirement of
beliefs being correct in equilibrium implies the following additional equilibrium
conditions: eM1 = e
M∗
1 , e
M
2 = e
M∗
2 ,and e
M
3 = e
M∗
3 .
10
Essentially, the principal observes output net of effort every period,
z¯t ≡ yt − e∗t = a+ zt. Using the first-order conditions (1.1) and the equilibrium
conditions on effort beliefs, we find that optimal first and second-period effort are
eM∗1 =
R2
2
Ey1,y2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
(1.2)
and
eM∗2 (y1) =
R
2
Ey2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
. (1.3)
For a more complete derivation of these equations, see Appendix A.1.
Note that optimal second-period effort (eM∗2 in equation (1.3)) is a function
of realized first-period output (z¯1 = a+ z1). For high output realizations, the
agent exerts less effort than when observed first-period output is low. Even
though actual second-period effort obeys this function, the principal and the agent
must make an ex ante decision on the type of contract (single or multi-period).
This ex ante decision therefore must be based on the expected level of
second-period effort, conditional upon period 1 information. Equations (1.2) and
(1.3) lead to our first proposition.
Proposition 1 (Expected) within-contract effort is increasing, eM∗1 < e
M∗
2 .
Proof See Appendix A.1.
The intuition is simple: the agent realizes that the benefits from exerting
any effort during the contract will accrue to him when the current contract is over.
The costs of exerting effort, however, are realized contemporaneously. In
addition, the principal weighs first and second-period outcomes equally when
11
updating beliefs about the ability. In each period the agent chooses an effort level
that sets the marginal costs of exerting effort equal to the (future) marginal
benefits. Since the returns to effort in period 1 are two periods away, he chooses a
lower level of effort in period one than in period two, when the present-value of
effort exertion benefits are higher.
1.2.2 Case 2: Single-period Contracts
As in Case 1, the agent will choose effort to maximize expected utility,
max
eS1 ,e
S
2 (·),eS3 (·)
U(wS1 )−
(
eS1
)2
+REy1
(
U
(
wS2 (y1)
)− (eS2 (y1))2)+
R2Ey1,y2
(
U3(w
S
3 (y1, y2))−
(
eS3 (y1, y2)
)2)
,
which results in the following first-order conditions,
eS1 =
R
2
∂Ey1,y2U2
∂e21
+
R
2
∂Ey1e
S
2 (y1)
∂e21
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂e21
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2e
S
3 (y1, y2)
∂e21
(1.4)
eS2 (y1) =
R
2
∂Ey2U3
∂e22
+
R
2
∂Ey2e
S
3 (y1, y2)
∂e21
eS3 (y1, y2) = 0.
In addition, the PBE condition that beliefs are correct in equilibrium
applies: eS1 = e
S∗
1 , e
S
2 = e
S∗
2 , and e
S
3 = e
S∗
3 .
In this case, the second-period wage is negotiated incorporating the
information conveyed from the agent’s first-period output. Furthermore, just as in
Case 1, the agent’s optimal effort choice at any given time is a response to past
observations.
The equilibrium conditions lead to two propositions, which together show
that aggregate effort in a multi-period contract is less than the effort exerted when
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the agent is covered by multiple single-period contracts. The effort incentives in
the multi-period contract, seen in isolation, make it less desirable to the principal.
Proposition 2 First-period effort under a single-period contract is greater than
first-period effort under a multi-period contract; eS∗1 ≥ eM∗1 .
Proof See Appendix A.1.
At first glance this proposition might seem at odds with a model that talks
of netting out effort levels and information structures that are independent of
effort. The principal correctly anticipates the effort level by imputing the highest
incentive compatible level of effort for the agent. This result is driven by the fact
that the agent in our model is finitely lived. The agent in a single-period deal can
affect a longer stream of revenues through is current actions than can the agent in
the first year of a multi-period contract. This is because the payoff next period for
the agent in a multi-period contract is fixed, whereas the agent in a single-period
contract will sign a new contract at the end of the current period, incorporating
any new information that arises.
Proposition 3 Effort in the second period of the agent’s life is the same
regardless of whether the agent is in a one-period contract or in the second period
of a two-period contract; eM∗2 = e
S∗
2 .
Proof See Appendix A.1.
The only unknown parameter with a fixed value throughout the game is
the agent’s true ability. Both the agent and the principal, therefore, update their
beliefs on ability using realizations of past output. In equilibrium, the market
correctly predicts what the agent’s level of effort will be, consequently information
updating is independent of effort. Recall that updating is done in a Bayesian
fashion (described above) with output from the first and second period affecting
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beliefs equally. Thus, an agent in the second period is choosing effort to affect
third-period wages, accounting for the fact that the principal has observed
one-period of production. The implication is that the effort incentives in period 2
are unconditional on the current or past contractual structures, and instead only
depend on the effect that second-period effort will have on third-period wage. In
essence, the last year of a multi-period deal is tantamount to a one-period
contract, in which a new contract has to be negotiated in the following period.
Viewed jointly, propositions 1, 2 and 3 unambiguously show that the total
amount of effort elicited from the agent in a multi-period contract is less than in a
series of single-period contracts. Despite these adverse effort incentives, the
insurance benefits of a long-term contract can cause it to be Pareto optimal, which
we discuss in the next section.
1.2.3 Optimal Contract Choice
At the start of the game the agent and the principal have a choice of
signing a contract that specifies a fixed wage for 1 or 2 periods. Propositions 2 and
3 jointly imply that, all else equal, the principal is worse off under the multi-period
contract scenario. Given that the agent is risk averse, however, there are potential
gains from insuring the agent against possible negative output shocks.
As in Holmstro¨m (1983), firms may prefer a multi-period contract, since
the per-period wage concessions given by the agent result in long-term contracts
being the less expensive mode of hiring labor. More formally, if there exists a
2-period profit sharing rule, κ2, which when compared to the corresponding
1-period rule, κ1, yields the following outcomes,
Ey1,y2((1− κ2)
[
y1(e
M∗
1 ) +Ry2(e
M∗
2 )
]
> (1− κ1)y1(eS∗1 ) +Ry2(eS∗2 )) (1.5)
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and
Ey1,y2(U(κ2 · y1(eM∗1 ))−
(
eM∗1
)2
+R
[
U(κ2 · y2(eM∗2 ))−
(
eM∗2
)2]
>
U(κ1 · y1(eS∗1 ))−
(
eS∗1
)2
+REy1
[
U(κ1 · y2(eS∗2 ))−
(
eS∗2
)2]
), (1.6)
then both the principal and the agent benefit from the multi-period deal. The
left-hand side of equation (1.5) shows the profit that the principal receives in the
multi-period case. While the principal receives a higher profit share than in the
1-period case, the adverse effort incentives simultaneously ensure that eM∗1 < e
S∗
1 .
For equation (1.5) to hold, the increased share of profits the principal receives
must be enough to at least offset the reduced output in a multi-period contract.
The guaranteed wage paid over two periods provides the agent with
increased certainty (note the difference in second-period utility in equation (1.6)
above). Since the increased share of profits associated with a higher κ2 directly
lowers the wage paid to the agent, κ2 cannot be set arbitrarily low. The choice of
contract in equilibrium depends on whether such a multi-period profit sharing rule
exists.
1.2.4 Numerical Simulation
We provide a numerical simulation of the model to (i) get a sense of how
much effort fluctuates within and across alternative contracts, and (ii) to
demonstrate a scenario in which a multi-period contract Pareto-dominates a series
of single-period contracts (thus showing existence). The CARA utility functional
form makes it relatively easy to find closed-form solutions to our first-order
conditions on effort above (see Appendix B for a detailed outline of how we
compute effort in each case). To begin, we set the model’s underlying parameters
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Figure 1.1: Effort profile under chosen parameter values
to the following values: α = 2, µ = 0.5, ha = 1, hz = 1, R = 0.9, κ1 = 0.5.
With closed-form solutions for effort, and the initial parameter values, we
can calculate the differences in effort that arise from the two contractual scenarios
considered. Figure 1.1 shows the resultant equilibrium effort paths. The solid line
shows the market’s ex ante expectation of effort given by the agent in Case 2, i.e.
under 3 one-period contracts. The single period contract case is exactly analogous
to the type of contract analyzed in the career concerns literature (e.g., Holmstrom
1999), with the same resulting optimal effort portfolio. The dashed line shows the
expected effort portfolio under Case 1, i.e. a two-period contract followed by a
single-period contract.
As expected from Proposition 2, effort in period 1 is lower for a two-period
deal than for a one-period deal. In particular, our parameter values imply that
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first-period effort is 60% lower under a multi-period contract. Nevertheless, our
simulation allows us to find a profit sharing rule such that a multiperiod contract
is Pareto preferred. If we set the share of profits going to the agent at 46.5%
(κ2 = 0.465), instead of 50% in a 1-period contract, the present value of the
principal’s expected lifetime profits increases by 1.5% in the multi-period case
relative to the single-period case. Meanwhile, the agent benefits enough from the
certainty of a multi-period deal that his present value of expected lifetime utility
increases by 2.1%.3
By adjusting the underlying parameters of the model, we can mimic various
real-world situations. The model allows for comparisons, for instance, of optimal
contract length for 2 different workers, e.g. an experienced worker (with many
past output realizations and precise ha) with a less experienced worker (low ha)
having the same expected ability. Specifically, if we increase the degree of precision
on ability so that ha = 5, the principal will require a multi-period profit share of
κ2 = 0.49 to be indifferent between the multi-period and single-period contract
cases. With such a profit share, however, the agent’s expected lifetime utility from
a series of single-period contracts is larger than the multi-period case: with such a
precise estimate of ability, the insurance benefits of a long-term contract are small.
1.3 Empirical Application
We analyze the agency implications of our model using 15 years of data
from the National Basketball Association. We view this sector as a suitable
setting for this kind of analysis for several reasons. First, the extensive (and
3We also calculate the scenario of the wage structure needed for the principal and agent to
agree to a single lifetime contract. In this case the agent will exert zero effort in every period.
The principal will require in return a κ3 = 0.42 in order to break even against the single-period
contract case. The wage in this case is so low that the agent prefers a single-period contract,
which itself is Pareto dominated by the multi-period contract scenario.
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oftentimes public) information on individual and firm characteristics makes sports
an ideal setting for testing many labor market phenomena (Kahn 2000). As
opposed to other professional sports, which include many incentive-based,
non-guaranteed contracts, basketball has simple, fixed-wage contractual structures
and rarely uses incentive clauses based on achievement.4 Second, basketball
players of all positions are evaluated roughly uniformly across a variety of
productivity categories. This is distinct from corporate employees and other
professional athletes, whose job performance and productivity can be measured
differently (or cannot be compared at all) depending on their position, job title, or
the organization to which they belong. Finally, the bargaining between team
owners and players (via their representatives) is well-known and we believe
matches the profit sharing in the theoretical construct.
1.3.1 Estimation Strategy
Consistent with our theoretical framework, we model log performance
(Y )—measured by the NBA efficiency score (described below)—as a linear
function of player ability (A), effort (E), and an idiosyncratic component (ζ˜),
ln(Yit) = α˜ + δ˜Eit + βAit + ζ˜it. (1.7)
Here i indexes individual players, and t indexes time.
Because the model above predicts that effort is directly related to the time
until the contract’s expiration, we model effort as a possibly nonlinear function of
4We cannot identify the players whose contracts include incentive clauses. All players have a
team-based incentive, which is that players receive a bonus based on ”pool” of playoff revenues if
their team makes the playoffs.
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years remaining in the contract. In the simplest (linear) case, we have
Eit = γ0 + γ1rit + uit (1.8)
with r denoting the years remaining in the contract. Combining equations (1.7)
and (1.8), we have
ln(Yit) = (α˜ + δ˜γ0) + βAit + δ˜γ1rit + ζ˜it + δ˜uit (1.9)
= α + βAit + δrit + ζit
for α = (α˜ + δ˜γ0), δ = δ˜γ1 and ζit = ζ˜it + δ˜uit. The coefficient of interest is δ. The
identifying assumption in the empirical estimation is that the number of years
remaining in a current contract at time t is a predetermined variable (i.e., it is
decided at some time t− s).
Least squares estimation of δ is consistent if the number of years remaining
in a player’s contract is exogenous to the error term, conditional on other ability
measures, Cov[ζit, rit|Ait] = 0. One concern is that the observable player
characteristics will only imperfectly proxy for a player’s true ability. That is,
ability should be modeled as Ait = βXit + ηi, with X denoting the vector of
observable player characteristics including the player’s current team, experience
(number of years in the league), age, height, college attended, race, when the
player was selected in the NBA draft (first selection, second selection, ., N th
selection), and superstar status. The unobserved ability component, ηi, is
problematic because contract length is not randomly distributed: longer contracts
tend to be given to players who have exhibited greater talent. As long as talent is
autocorrelated, having many years remaining in a contract will be associated with
high (unobserved) ability, which leads to greater output, i.e. the estimation has an
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omitted variable which exerts upward bias on δ.
Our data allows us to estimate a fixed-effects (within-groups) model in
which we specify the random component, ζit = θt + ηi + εit, to include year-specific
shocks distributed to all players (θt), as well as individual-specific (ηi) and
idiosyncratic components (εit). In addition, we include in vector A the duration
and total value of the current contract (within a fixed contract duration, more able
players are paid more).5 Conditional on the duration of the current contract, δ
represents the percentage change in output when a player is one year further from
his contract termination date. In the presence of moral hazard, we expect δ < 0.
1.3.2 Data
The data were collected from a variety of sources. First, we compiled player
characteristics and performance statistics from Sports-Reference Inc., which
collects information on professional athletes. We obtained data on NBA player
characteristics including height, weight, position played, team, where the player
was selected in the NBA draft, the first year in the league, college attended, and
birth date. Contract information from 2000 to 2006 was primarily derived from
the USA Today NBA contract database, which gives the annual salary, and
contract start and end dates for every player in the league. Using this information
together with additional publicly available sources,6 we assigned contract
information prior to 2000 for each player for all years possible (1991 was the
earliest). We also were able to identify and correct several mistakes and omissions
from the USA Today database.
5While higher value contracts are given to more able players, there may be an income effect
which dampens the career concerns. Which effect domintates is a quantitative question. Though
we expect the partial derivative of the value of the contract on performance to be positive, the
interpetation may be somewhat muffled.
6These other sources include sports consulting companies, newspaper articles, and
independent gurus and hobbyists.
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In the NBA, player performance is multidimensional and includes, among
other variables, points scored, rebounds, shooting percentage, assists, and
turnovers. To create an objective measure to judge performance, the NBA has
created an ”efficiency rating,” which is a function that maps a player’s
multidimensional output from RN to R. The efficiency rating is claimed to be
used by coaches and scouts to evaluate a player’s performance. While certain
beneficial components of the efficiency score can only increase with the number of
minutes played (e.g., rebounds and assists), other damaging components (e.g.,
turnovers and missed shots) may also increase. The net effect is that the efficiency
score is used to compare the performance of players of all positions. The efficiency
score is calculated for each game played. We use average annual efficiency score
(across all games played that year) as the dependent variable in our estimation.7
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for our sample. In all, we have
2,260 player-year observations which are derived from an unbalanced panel of 654
players. The average player in our sample is 6 feet 7 inches tall, was the 25th
selection in the NBA draft, is observed for 3.5 years (max 13) throughout at least
part of 2 contracts (max 5). Players enter the sample at mean age of 25 with
almost 4 years of professional experience. The dominant racial category of our
sample is American-born black; however, about a quarter of the sample is either
7Information on the NBA efficiency score, including the formula can be found at
http://www.nba.com/statistics/efficiency.html. There are several competing measures of player
performance including the ”win score” and ”player efficiency rating.” The correlation coefficient
between each of these measures is approximately 0.9. If we substitute either of the alternative
measures as the dependent variable in our empirical analysis, the results of shirking are, if
anything, more pronounced. As an example of the efficiency index consider two players. Player
A plays 43 minutes, makes 5 of 22 shots, 7 of 9 free throw attempts, gets 8 rebounds, 6 assists, 3
steals, commits 4 turnovers and scores 17 total points. Player B plays 29 minutes, making 5 of
his 8 shots, 3 of 4 free throw attempts, gets 4 rebounds, 7 assists, commits 2 turnovers, and
scores 15 total points. According to the NBA efficiency rating we find that Player A scored an
efficiency of +11, while player B received +20 and had the better game. Kevin Garnett was the
league leader by this measure of efficiency for the 2006-2007 NBA season.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
American-born white (12.0%), or of ”other” racial composition (10.7%), which
overwhelmingly includes foreign-born players.
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the contractual terms.
The average contract in our sample lasts 3 years—80% of players sign a contract
lasting 5 or fewer years—however, we observe contracts lasting every value
between 1 and 12 years inclusive. The average player receives $2.3 million per
year, with a large standard deviation.8
Panel C of Table 1.1 presents the descriptive performance statistics for our
8All dollar values have been converted to 1995$ to account for inflation.
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Figure 1.2: Frequency distribution for years remaining in player
contracts
sample, as measured by the NBA efficiency score. Players achieve an average per
game NBA efficiency rating of 10.0, though there is quite a lot of variability in this
measure—the players identified as superstars have a mean efficiency score of 23.5
(max=36.9). The table also shows that the mean efficiency score is increasing
throughout the final 3 years of a player’s current contract.9
Figure 1.2 presents a histogram of the distribution of years remaining in
the current contract for the 2,260 player-year observations. This figure emphasizes
that while we observe players who have a variety of contractual terms, we also
observe players at many different stages in their contract.
Although contracts can never be terminated, a rare occurrence is to
renegotiate before the expiration. To avoid problems of endogeneity, we denote
9These statistics were calculated using only the subset of players with contracts of duration 3
years or longer.
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the number of years remaining in a contract according to its original terms.
Assigning the number of years remaining according to the ex post contract
duration would encounter the problem of finding high performance during the end
of the contract not because of changes in effort, but instead because large
performance shocks led to renegotiation of a new contract.10 Figure 1.2 presents a
histogram of the distribution of years remaining in the current contract for the
2,260 player-year observations. This figure emphasizes that while we observe
players who have a variety of contractual terms, we also observe players at many
different stages in their contract.
Players leave our data once they are ”waived” (i.e., fired), retire, or are
otherwise not hired by any team following an expired contract. In the NBA, teams
may hire a maximum of 15 players. If a team decides to fire a player, it must still
pay him according to the contract terms, but the vacant roster spot may be filled
with another player. A small minority of players sign extremely short-term
contracts (often 10-day contracts). These contracts are usually given to relatively
low-ability players signed to fill a suddenly available roster spot, usually stemming
from injury. We include only players who are signed to contracts lasting one or
more years.
1.3.3 Empirical Results
Table 1.2 presents the coefficients from four variations of our estimation
equation (equation (1.9)). In column (1) we estimate the simplest, though naive
version of a fixed-effects regression model under the assumption that the number
of years until contract renewal has a linear relationship with output. Consistent
10Approximately 2% of contracts were renegotiated before the original expiration date. Table
3 (discussed below) presents results of an estimation procedure selecting on consecutive,
non-renegotiated contracts.
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with the equilibria in the theoretical model above, the results show that, ceteris
paribus, the more years remaining in a player’s current contract, the lower his
performance. The estimated coefficient implies an average of a 2.2% reduction in
output for each additional year remaining until contract renewal. This effect is
statistically significant. Salary and total contract duration serve as (possibly
time-variant) ability proxies, and performance increases with each. Productivity
decreases with experience, reflecting that aging in professional sports tends to
have a negative effect on performance (Fair 2007). Because height, superstar
status, and draft position are constant within players, they are dropped from the
fixed-effect analysis. Age is also dropped from the fixed-effects models because
changes in age and experience are perfectly co-linear.
In column (2) we allow for the number of years remaining in the contract
to have a non-linear effect on output. Indeed, one plausible scenario is that the
number of years remaining in the contract is negatively associated with
performance, but that the marginal decrease in effort is a diminishing function of
the number of years remaining in the contract. In this example, the linear
prediction estimated in column (1) would underestimate the marginal moral
hazard effect for initial increases in contract duration, and overestimate the
marginal moral hazard effect in the early years of a long contract.
A second estimation issue with column (1) is that, while the model controls
for gains in league-specific experience, it does not account for gains in
team-specific learning or experience. Indeed, 43% of all instances of switching
teams occur at the end of an expiring contract. To the extent that players accrue
team-specific knowledge, and that this learning tends to occur towards the
beginning of contracts, the omission of team-specific tenure would bias the results
towards finding increased within-contract productivity. In column (2), we present
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Table 1.2: Regression results of In(efficiency) on player characteristics and years 
remaining in the current contract. 
 
 Fixed Effects OLS 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years remaining -0.0219* [-2.2] 
-0.0870** 
[-3.5] 
-0.2165** 
[-6.6] 
0.0246 
[0.7] 
Years remaining squared – 0.0106** [3.5] 
0.0161** 
[5.1] 
-0.0059 
[-1.8] 
Experience -0.0683* [-5.1] 
-0.1026* 
[-6.2] 
-0.1640** 
[8.0] 
-0.0011 
[0.1] 
Team-specific experience – 0.0655** [6.1] 
0.0571** 
[5.3] 
0.0844** 
[7.8] 
Years remaining x experience – – 0.0167** [6.6] 
0.0050* 
[1.9] 
Salary 0.0055** [4.3] 
0.0033** 
[2.6] 
0.0032** 
[2.5] 
0.0109** 
[8.6] 
Total duration of current 
contract 
0.0355* 
[2.3] 
0.0310* 
[2.1] 
0.0304* 
[2.1] 
0.0217 
[1.1] 
Superstar – – – 0.2124** [3.5] 
Age – – – -0.0117 [-1.2] 
Height – – – -0.1317** [-2.8] 
Draft Pick – – – -0.0105** [9.4] 
Race     
American-born, white – – – -0.1566** [-3.6] 
Foreign-born – – – -0.0235 [-0.4] 
R2 0.1168 0.1459 0.1692 0.3817 
N 2,260 2,260 2,260 2,260 
ρ 0.7863 0.8248 0.8579 – 
 
Notes: t-statistics derived from robust standard errors reported in brackets;  All regressions also 
include team dummies and T-1 year-specific dummies.  The OLS results additionally include 
college-attended dummies;  * and ** denote statistical significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01. 
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the results including controls for changes in team-specific experience, measured by
the number of years on the current team.
The coefficients imply a nonlinear productivity effect—the largest decreases
in effort are associated with initial movements away from the termination date.
The first two coefficients reported in column (2) suggest that, all else equal, a
player’s effort in the penultimate year of his contract is 6% lower than effort in the
final year of the contract. Similarly, effort in the player’s third-to-last year of the
contract is 4% lower than in his penultimate contract year, and effort in his
fourth-to-last contract year is an additional 2% lower than in his third-to-last
year. Although the coefficients in this model imply that output tends to rise for
sufficiently large numbers of years remaining, the effort effects beyond year 4 are
not statistically significant. In addition, we find that players do appear to acquire
beneficial team-specific training, with productivity increasing approximately 6%
per year. There are no significant changes to the other coefficients, with respect to
those in column (1).
Column (3) reports the coefficients from a regression allowing for both a
non-linear effect of years remaining and for an interaction between a player’s
experience and number of years remaining in his contract. The coefficient on the
interaction between years remaining and experience is positive and statistically
significant, implying that the adverse effort effect of a multi-period contract is
reduced for more experienced players.
The reported coefficients allow for a comparison of the effect on output of a
long-term contract for a player different stages of his career. For example, the
coefficients suggest that the performance of a player with two years of experience
and in the penultimate year of the contract will be 15% less than the same player
in the final year of his current contract. This output differential is approximately
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twice as large as would be the case for the same player with 6 years of experience.
In addition, the coefficients imply that the within contract effort fluctuations
approach zero for players with over 10 years of experience. This finding conforms
with our theoretical results. Because the market has a history of outcomes on
which to base its estimate of ability, the precision of this estimate will be
relatively high. The outcome of any singular period will therefore have a relatively
small impact on the beliefs about ability. Second, the performance of older players
affects a shorter stream of future wages and therefore the present discounted
benefit of effort exertion is relatively low. For these reasons, the maximum
incentive compatible level of effort is reduced.11
The F -statistic testing the joint significance of the player-specific effects is
5.47, 5.44, and 5.66 for the models in columns (1) through (3) respectively (the 99
percent critical value on the F table is 1.16). In addition, the estimated parameter
ρ in the fixed-effects models, which represents the proportion of the total variance
in log performance that can be attributed to the player fixed-effects, ηi, is larger
than zero. Together, the large value of the F statistic and the ρ suggest that the
panel-level estimates are important and are likely to be different than pooled OLS
estimates. We test this in column (4), which presents the results of our estimation
equation specifying the error term as ζit = θt + ξit, excluding player fixed effects.
Estimation via pooled OLS allows the inclusion of many variables that are
constant across time. As in the fixed-effects analysis, we find that salary, contract
duration, and team-specific experience are positively associated with performance.
Because ”superstars” have a large positive, external effect on league notoriety and
11Although we control for the effect of experience on output, there may be a concern that the
effects of this model are being driven by differentials in gains to experience between younger and
older players. There is, however, effectively no difference between the models presented here and
versions which additionally allow for a non-linear impact of experience on output, for instance by
additionally controlling for the square of experience.
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revenue aside from their performance on the court (Hausman and Leonard [1997])
and often receive a large portion of income from endorsements outside of their
NBA contract, we created a superstar indicator variable to denote these players
when we move away from player fixed-effects analysis.12 Performance among
players that we classify as superstars is, on average, 21% higher than their peers.
Likewise, top selections in the NBA draft perform better than those selected later
on. Finally, whites tend to have lower output than blacks, and age is negatively
associated with output.
The OLS estimates, however, fail to find any within-contract performance
effects, suggesting that, even when controlling for all observable player
characteristics, including proxies for ability such as superstar status and draft
position (first selection, second selection, ..., N th selection), unobserved individual
heterogeneity appears to be an important source of bias.
1.3.4 Illustrations and Extensions
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the incentive effects of contracts,
we estimate a version of equation (1.9) identical to the fixed-effects model
reported in column (3) of Table 1.2, with the exception that we group players on
the basis of years remaining in their contract, rather than estimating years
remaining as a continuous variable. In this estimation, we combine all players with
eight or more years remaining into one category (less than 1% of the sample).
Figure 1.3 presents the combined coefficients from the years-remaining dummy
variables, and corresponding years remaining × experience interaction terms. The
reported coefficients are all for a hypothetical player with three years of experience
12Players we identify as superstars during our sample period are Ray Allen, Kobe Bryant,
Vince Carter, Tim Duncan, Kevin Garnett, Allen Iverson, Michael Jordan, Jason Kidd, Tracy
McGrady, Alonzo Mourning, Dirk Nowitzki, Shaquille O’Neal, and Paul Pierce. Marginal
changes in the set of players classified as superstars has no substantive effect on the analysis.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated performance-years remaining elasticity
Note: Figure depicts the results of a variation of equation(9) which esitimates the effort effect of
the number of years remaning in the current contract on output, allowing the effect of each year
to enter individually; the coefficients shown are the combined years remaining and years
remaining/experience interaction for a player with 3 years experience; all results are relative to
output in the final year of the contract with robust standard errors reported in italics; ** and *
denote p < 0.01 and p < 0.1 respectively.
and should be interpreted as being relative to output in the final year of the
contract. Robust standard errors are shown in italics.
These results re-emphasize that player productivity is negatively associated
with time until contract renewal. Players in the penultimate contractual year
produce, on average, 7.2% fewer NBA efficiency points, every game. There is a
steady drop in performance for each additional year remaining. The negative
effect on output more than doubles for players with 3 years remaining in the
current contract (23% lower output than in the final year). In absolute terms, this
difference amounts to a little more than 1/3 of a standard deviation in the NBA
efficiency score for an average player, and is approximately equivalent to needing
two additional shot attempts per game to get the same number of points, or
having one standard deviation more assists per game, holding all other
performance statistics constant. As in Table 1.2, the adverse effort effect of
30
multi-period contracts level off quite quickly. Relative to the final year of the
contract, output for players with four or more years remaining is nearly identical,
with performance leveling off at about 30% less than output in the terminal year.
The magnitude of the within-contract changes in player performance are
quantitatively similar to those in Lazear (2000), who finds approximately a
44-percent increase in output among auto glass installers associated with moving
from a guaranteed salary to a piece rate compensation schedule.
In Table 1.3, we present the results of the performance effect of being in
the first or last contract year. Again, all reported coefficients are derived from
fixed-effects (within-group) estimation which includes all covariates reported in
column (2) of Table 1.2. In particular, the results reported in Panel A are derived
from a version of estimation equation (1.9), substituting dummy variables
denoting a player in the first year or last year in a contract, for the continuous
measure of years remaining in the contract. We find that players score 7 percent
fewer efficiency points per game in the first year of their current contract, and 6
percent more efficiency points in the last year of their contract relative to all other
years. These effects are statistically significant, and are similar to the results
found in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3, above. The results are larger in magnitude than
findings in previous studies such as Berri and Krautman (2006) who use a smaller
panel of and a less detailed estimation method to find only a 1 percent decrease in
output associated with being in the first year of a contract.
In Panel B, we select the subsample of players in the last year of their
contract, for whom we also have data on the first year of the subsequent contract
(714 player-year observations). Using only these two observations, we estimate a
fixed-effects model with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the player
is in the first year of a new contract. We find that relative to the year prior (i.e.,
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Table 1.3: Fixed effects regression results In(efficiency) conditional
on a player being in the first or last year of the current contract
Note: The models controll for all variables n Table 2, column(2); Robust standard errors
reported; * and ** denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.
the final year of the previous contract), player productivity falls by 16%, lending
further support to the hypothesis of decreased effort subsequent to signing a new
contract.13
1.4 Concluding Remarks
Our results lend theoretical and empirical support to the notion that
workers will be less industrious the more distant the expiration of the current
contract is, even in the presence of career concerns. Results of this, and related
work, have crucial implications for the contemporary labor market, in which
contractual arrangements frequently specify payment over a fixed period of time in
return for services rendered. The model lends a sound economic justification for
the existence of multi-period contracts in spite of the effort effects: with uncertain
output, these contracts act as insurance for the agent and, in return for bearing
13There is potential selection bias in panel B of Table 1.3. Namely, if the only players who are
able to continue in the league are players who had large positive random output shocks in the
final year of their contract, we would expect such a large shock to be unlikely to occur in the
subsequent year. Nevertheless, we view this estimation as a useful illustration and robustness
check.
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some of the risk, firms benefit by paying a lower wage. While the results we derive
per se depend on the functional form assumptions, we are confident that changes
in these assumptions will yield qualitatively similar results. In addition, while it is
beyond the scope of this paper, we conjecture that our results carry out
qualitatively to a model with N periods.
To the extent that multi-period contracts give reduced effort incentives, one
might wonder if there is any economic justification as to why NBA contracts, and
those in other labor markets, are written in this fixed-wage manner. Indeed, an
optimal contract should include all (free) contingencies which provide information
regarding the agent’s (hidden) actions. The use of incentive-laden contracts, for
instance, which offer performance bonuses contingent on output each year, could
serve the dual purpose of allowing for a more precise proxy of the agent’s
underlying ability, and to offset the effect of shirking in the early years of the
contract. The use of these incentive contracts in the NBA, however, is minimal.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, 1991) suggest that one reason why
real-world incentive schemes are relatively rare may be that when an agent’s
”output” is multidimensional, there may exist efficiency reasons for paying
fixed-wages because any attempt to specifically engineer incentives to motivate
hard work in every period may conflict with other team or league-wide
profitability goals. Thus, including an array of bonuses is not “free” since their
presence may give rise to new sources of inefficiencies. Including additional
year-by-year player bonuses in the NBA for surpassing a prespecified points-scored
threshold, for instance, may motivate the player to shoot at every opportunity
which, in-turn, conflicts with sound teamwork that is valued by fans and is critical
for overall franchise success. In the Holmstro¨m-Milgrom model of multitasking,
the ability to separate job tasks among workers is essential for such incentives to
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be efficient. The ability to separate tasks in baseball and football, in which players
perform more specialized roles (and the relative inability in basketball) helps
explain the relative prevalence in their respective contract designs.
Given the portfolio of within-contract effort that we find theoretically and
empirically, another puzzle is why the principal in our model weights performance
in every period equally. The principal could induce constant (high) effort by
announcing that when the time comes for re-contracting, she will use an inverse
weighting formula that puts more emphasis on performance in early periods of the
contract. There are at least two potential problems with this strategy. First,
neither in our model, nor in reality is there commitment by firms to the structure
of future contracts; indeed such a commitment would effectively be a contract in
itself. In addition, announcements of this kind are not renegotiation proof. Any
alternate weighting scheme has the additional effect of reducing the insurance
gains to the agent. Thus, such an alternative would erode the benefits inherent in
long-term contracts, and lead to fewer observed long-term contracts since agents
will be less willing to make the necessary wage concessions.
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CHAPTER TWO
Big Fish, Small Pond: An Analysis of
Peer Effects in the NBA
2.1 Introduction
Many workplaces require individuals to work with a team or group of peers.
Often the outcome of this collective effort is a joint product where individual
contributions are not easily identified. This is particularly pertinent if an employer
is evaluating the prospects of a future hire. Even if individual contributions can be
reasonably identified, as in the sports industry, teams may be concerned about the
effect of teammates on an individual’s performance. In similar vein an individual
will be concerned about the scope and magnitude of his role within an
organization, even if the final product is a joint one. This may assume particular
significance if the worker seeks employment in a different organization.
Having better quality co-workers might enhance the rate of learning for
individuals through the sharing of experiences, knowhow and by them setting a
good example. If the outcome of the interaction with teammates is a joint
product, then this in turn can lead to a higher valuation of individual productivity
by the market. On the flip side an individual may not get enough credit for his
contributions, be forced into a limited role or suffer by constantly being compared
to better quality peers.
The National Basketball Association draft provides me with the ideal setup
to analyze the impact of teammates on individual outcomes. The draft is the
primary avenue of entry into the league. The outcomes I analyze include player
performance and wages. The wealth of player and team information available
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enables me to account for individual quality and isolate the effects of teammates.
I find that having better teammates has no impact on player performance
in the first 4 years of his playing career. However having better teammates can
reduce salary. Closer scrutiny shows that this effect is driven by players who have
roles on the team that differ from the player in question. Perhaps even more
surprisingly having a high quality incumbent at your own position, potentially
limiting opportunity, has no impact on player salary.
I can see similar phenomena in numerous other settings. In academia
writing papers with co-authors can lead to group success in terms of publications.
However, when tenure decisions have to be made there might be an attempt to
apportion credit. In such a situation, having co-authored with people with a long
history of publication success, could lead to the perception that the ultimate
success of the work is owed to them.
In many investment banking firms work is done in teams or ‘desks’ and
junior workers may find it hard to get promoted or recognized if they are working
with established senior traders.
2.1.1 Related Literature
There is a fairly extensive literature in economics that focuses on how the
behavior and quality of peers impacts attitudes and outcomes of individuals. In
education, Sacerdote (2001) finds that the academic performance of roommates in
college positively impacts own academic performance. He uses the random
assignment of freshmen roommates at Dartmouth College to determine that peer
effects on GPA occur at the roommate level. Hoxby (2000) also finds that there
are peer effects in reading achievement within the classroom. There is work on
how peer attitudes affect health outcomes and technology (e.g. Trogdon et al
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2007, Oster and Thornton 2011). Peer effects have also been analyzed in the fields
of Development (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1995) and labor (e.g Munshi 2003).
The branch of the literature to which this paper belongs, deals with peer
effects within the workplace. Direct evidence on peer effects has been difficult to
come by largely due to paucity of data on firm and employee productivity. A few
papers have recently attempted to shed light on this matter. Mas and Moretti
(2009) use data from a large UK supermarket to show that there is a positive
productive spillover from high quality workers into a shift. They show that
workers respond more strongly to co-workers with whom they frequently interact.
In perhaps the most closely related work to this Guryan et al (2009) use random
assignments of playing partners in professional golf tournaments to test for peer
effects in the workplace. They find no evidence that playing partners’ ability
affects player performance, in contrast with the other studies listed. Finally Kato
and Shu (2009) use data for weavers in China to find evidence that workers do
better when matched with more able co-workers. They also find that peer effects
arise across rather than within social groups indicating the main channel for these
is competitive pressure in inter-group competition.
This paper takes the existing literature beyond its current scope by not
only examining peer effects on productivity or performance but by extending the
analysis to how the market views individual and team achievements.
2.2 Institutions
Peer Effects are difficult to measure for multiple reasons. Co-workers
simultaneously affect each other’s productivity causing the well known ‘reflection
problem’. In addition the selection of people into a group may be a result of
factors that are common to the group and not observable to the econometrician.
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Certain other factors may affect the group as a whole causing a bias.
The NBA, using the draft lottery, gives me a setting where a number of
these hurdles can be overcome, or at the very least minimized. What follows is a
brief description of the NBA’s institutional structure.
The NBA currently has 30 franchises (at various points in our sample there
have been 28 and 29 respectively). Of these 30 teams, 16 make the playoffs every
year- 8 apiece from the Eastern and Western Conference. A stated goal of the
NBA is to promote parity in the league and the NBA draft is set up to send the
best incoming players to the weakest teams. The 14 teams that miss the playoffs
are put into a weighted lottery system to determine the order in which they will
pick in the draft. The worse a team did in the year prior, the higher the odds of
them winning the lottery and picking first. In my sample covering 14 years, a
team with the highest odds has won the right to the first pick only twice.
For all prospective NBA players below the age of 22, the draft is the only
means of entering the league. If a player enters and is not chosen in the draft then
he is free to sign with any team. Eligible players declare for the draft and the
teams pick them in an order determined by the NBA draft lottery. I will show
that teams always have an incentive to pick the best player available to them.
A team is allowed to trade the right to it’s draft pick (in some cases it can
trade the right to pick in a future draft). In this case the recipient of this right
picks in it’s stead. However these trades have to be revenue neutral for the NBA
to permit them. A practical example of such a trade is when the Washington
Wizards dealt the 5th pick in the NBA draft (along with some other players) to
the Minnesota Timberwolves for Randy Foye and Mike Miller, two relatively
accomplished players. In this situation, for the purposes of the analysis, I say that
the Timberwolves made the pick. Since the NBA draft lottery covers only the
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choices of the first 14 choices I restrict our sample to these picks. All picks after
the 14th pick are made in a reverse order based on the teams’ record in the prior
year.
Rookies are paid according to a predetermined pay scale, based solely on
the number they were picked at in the draft. Teams guarantee wages for 2 years at
the predetermined rookie salary and have the option of extending this rookie-scale
contract for another 2 years. Thus the drafting team has effective control over a
player’s playing time and salary for his first 4 years in the league. Teams should
pick the best player available to them in the draft, since salary is fixed. Picking
the most productive player maximizes team surplus.
At the end of a player’s 3rd year in the league, teams have the right to
make the player a contract extension offer. If a new contract is negotiated at that
stage, it takes effect at the end of the player’s 4th year in the league. If a team
does not come to an agreement with the player by the end of his 4th year he
becomes a restricted free agent. A restricted free agent can sign a contract with
any team but the incumbent team has the right to match the terms of that
contract and retain the player’s services beyond the fourth year. Contracts in the
NBA typically take the form of a guaranteed number of years for a guaranteed
amount of money. This means irrespective of the player’s performance over the
duration he will receive the dollar amount specified in his contract. Contracts
cannot be renegotiated for the duration of the contract. If a team trades a player
during that time, the new team simply assumes the parameters of the player’s
existing contract.
The NBA has a ‘soft salary cap’ system. While team spending on players is
restricted (by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement), teams have
certain exemptions spend over the cap that they can choose to avail themselves of.
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In contrast a hard cap would be one where the dollar figure of the salary cap is
binding. One important exception is that teams can go over the cap to retain their
own players. This enables the incumbent team to offer a player up to the league
mandated maximum salary even if their other salary obligations exceed the cap.
2.3 Strategy
In this section I discuss how I can use the institutional set-up to effectively
analyze peer effects.
I start by examining how player performance is impacted by the quality of
teammates. As noted earlier, player performance is simultaneously determined
with teammate performance leading to the reflection problem ‘ala Manski’. I
address this by using a proxy for teammate quality that is unaffected by the
quality of the players in question. A natural candidate is the quality of players in
the year before the team drafted the player. Teams do not turn over their entire
roster on a year-to-year basis, which means the quality of players on a team is
likely to be (positively) correlated across years.
NBA players have different roles on the team based on the positions they
play on the court. For this analysis I divide the players into three categories-
guards, forwards and centers. In subsequent sections I will be cognizant of the fact
that players might be affected differently by players who play the same position as
them than those who play other positions. A plausible conjecture is that better
quality players at other (complimentary) positions might improve a player’s
effectiveness by putting him in a better position to succeed. On the other hand it
may also limit the player’s opportunities, since better teammates would naturally
demand a more significant role. Having a better player at his own position may
squeeze a player’s playing time but may enhance learning in other ways.
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I analyze the impact of teammates on a variety of player outcomes. I look
at minutes played in the first and second year, which indicate an ability to
contribute immediately. I also look at efficiency (per minute) measures of
performance and raw statistics at various stages of his career and salary. The
impact of teammates on efficiency metrics and raw performance measures may
differ because the former does not automatically increase with playing
opportunity. Better players are likely to have both higher efficiency and raw
statistics, but there are instances of players playing efficiently in limited minutes.
For my estimates to be convincing I must first establish 2 intermediate
outcomes . The first is that a player’s draft pick number be a good control for
player quality. I establish this by showing that a team’s choice is unaffected by
their most significant positional need.
The second is that the quality of significant teammates (those playing the
most minutes at each position) in the year prior to the player joining, is a good
proxy for the quality of the actual teammates. For this the quality of teammates
needs to be correlated across time. This is, in effect, a simplified first stage
regression for a 2SLS analysis.
As I move through the paper I will also add certain institutional details
that are pertinent to the analysis. For reference, position refers to a player’s role
on the team.
2.4 Variables and Data
I construct a dataset to examine peer effects using the website
basketball-reference.com as the primary source for performance and contract data.
I identify all players selected in the first 14 picks of the NBA draft (i.e. all
‘lottery’ picks) since 1994. I divide all players into three commonly used positional
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categories- guard, forward, center. These categories are indicative of the role a
player is expected to play on the court. Guards for example are typically the
shortest players on the court and are responsible for ball handling and long range
shooting. Basketball is a fluid game with moving parts and players’ roles are not
as restricted as they are in football and baseball.
Player salary is fixed by the rookie scale for his first 4 years in the league
which implies that the wage in the fifth year is a natural dependent variable. I use
the first salary that a player receives as a ‘free agent’ in the market as my
dependent variable in the wage regressions.
As discussed in the previous section I use 2 different categories of
performance measures, an efficiency index and raw player statistics. The
particular metric I use is the Player Efficiency Rating (PER) developed by ESPN
writer, John Hollinger. This statistic collapses multi-dimensional player statistics
into one comprehensive metric that adjust for team pace and minutes played. This
measure penalizes heavily for inefficient play (for example scoring a lot of points
by shooting frequently but with a low conversion rate) and rewards players who
combine well with teammates. The market for NBA players may value raw
statistics differently from efficiency indexes, especially in contract negotiations. To
this end I consider the most commonly reported player statistics in my
regressions. These measures are points, rebounds and assists though I construct a
variable that is the sum of all three.
Various factors may determine player salary and performance. Due to data
constraints I use only efficiency indexes as my measures of teammate quality.
Since teammate performance is affected by player quality and vice-versa, I proxy
(instrument) for teammate quality using the quality of players on the team in the
year prior. This also enables us to abstract from any personnel decision that
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might have been made after the identity of the player chosen was known. I denote
the PER of the incumbent at the same position as ‘incumbent quality’. I
construct another variable ‘average teammate quality’ which is the average of the
PER of the players who played the most minutes at the two other positions, one
at each position. I include team wins in the year prior, as another indicator of
quality. This can be interpreted as a measure of residual quality after the most
important players have been accounted for and may include factors such as
coaching, management and quality of support staff.
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
I include all players drafted in the first 14 picks of the NBA draft from
1994 to 2006 in our sample. 1994 was the first year that a rookie salary scale was
instituted and enforced which meant that all rookies from a given draft class
became free agents at the same time. Since I need salary information after a
player completes his rookie contract I can only include players drafted up to 2006.
There are a total of 178 player observations in my sample . Of these 82
players classified as guards, 57 as forwards and the remaining 39 were centers.
Players in the sample had an average PER of 15.7. As a reference point the
league average for PER is normalized to 15. The standard deviation in an average
year ranges from 5 to 6. In the description of PER given by John Hollinger, he
postulates that moving from a PER of 16.5 to about 20 is a jump from an above
average starter to an all-star. The raw measure of performance that I use is the
sum of points, rebounds and assists and players in the dataset have an average of
20.6 in their 4th year.
119 of the 178 players in our sample re-signed with the teams that they
played for in the fourth year. The average salary that players in our sample got
43
was about 6.8 million dollars which is slightly higher than the average salary
league wide over the same period. The salaries are constrained by a league
mandated minimum and maximum- In 2010-11 the maximum salary for a player
entering his 5th year was about 15.5 million dollars while the minimum amount on
a guaranteed contract was approximately $800,000 .
2.5 Preliminary Checks
From an anecdotal perspective, I argue that teams do in fact pick the best
player available regardless of position played. Most of the teams in our sample
missed the playoffs in the year prior and therefore should be considered talent
deficient relative to the other teams in the league. Therefore they have a strong
incentive to pick the most talented player still available. In addition since the
salary of the player is predetermined by the slot that he is picked at, there are no
financial incentives to picking an inferior player. Finally teams have the option of
choosing a player and trading him if they consider him a poor fit.
Table 2.1 largely bears this out. In this table I present a set of linear
probability models showing the impacts of teammate quality on the position
played by the drafted player. The choice of a center or guard is unaffected by the
quality of teammates. The choice of a forward decreases marginally with the
quality of the players at complimentary positions. While this seems a tad
counter-intuitive (we would expect the likelihood of being picked to go up) the
effect is small, about 3 percent.
In order to use prior teammate performance as a proxy or instrument for
current teammate quality, I show that the instruments are correlated with our
explanatory variables of interest. When I regress first year teammate performance
at same position on the performance of teammates the year prior I get a
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Table 2.1: Is player position impacted by teammate quality?
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates statistically significant at 5 per
cent level .
coefficient of .64. It is significant at all confidence levels. A similar regression for
players at other positions yields a coefficient of about .8 and is similarly
significant. This suggests the use of the proxies described above is valid.
It is instructive to do a similar analysis with the average of teammate
quality in the first 4 years of a player’s career. Unsurprisingly the corelation
shrinks in both regressions (relative to a regression of first year teammates alone)
but the overall picture looks the same. Teammates can change over the first 4
years due to player movement across teams. Teammate quality both at the
player’s position and complementary positions is strongly correlated to the quality
of the teammates at the same positions in the year prior. The relevant coefficients
are .6 for a player at your own position and .59 for players at other positions.
The results shown in tables one and two confirm my intuition that
teammate quality is correlated across years, but that teams pick the best player
available regardless of position.
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Table 2.2: Is previous teammate quality a good proxy for current
teammates?
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses;* indicates statistically significant at 5 per
cent level.
2.6 Impact of Teammates on Selected Performance Outcomes
I will analyze a series of outcomes that span the player’s first five years in
the league. I look at the minutes that a player plays in the first two years of his
career and his efficiency rating in his rookie year. I examine the impact of
teammates on a player’s efficiency in his third and fourth year. Given the
importance of raw statistics in contract negotiations. I also examine the impact on
the sum of a player’s points, rebounds and assists (the three most commonly
reported statistics).
I report the results of two parallel sets of regressions. I use teammate
quality in the year prior to the player joining as a proxy for teammate quality as
well as an instrument for it. The results of both have the same signs and similar
magnitudes.
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Table 2.3: Does teammate quality affect early player performance outcomes? 	
 Minutes Played 
Year 1 (log) 
Player Efficiency 
Year 1 
Minutes Played Year 
2 (log) 
 Proxy IV Proxy IV Proxy IV 
Incumbent quality same 
position 
0.001 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.042) 
-0.005 
(0.114) 
-0.024 
(0.175) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
0.038 
(0.037) 
Incumbent quality other 
position 
-0.037 
(-0.037) 
-0.059 
(0.054) 
-0.071 
(0.151) 
-0.129 
(0.220) 
-0.041 
(0.032) 
-0.007 
(0.065) 
Wins Previous Year 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Guard 
0.735* 
(0.202) 
0.781* 
(0.194) 
2.298* 
(0.842) 
2.475* 
(0.808) 
0.342* 
(0.176) 
0.314* 
(0.150) 
Forward 
0.588* 
(0.182) 
0.580* 
(0.176) 
1.644* 
(0.762) 
1.644* 
(0.734) 
0.199 
(0.158) 
0.189 
(0.143) 
Pick Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared .355 .353 .219 .225 .253 .191 
N 178 174 174 171 177 172 	
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses;  * indicates statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. 
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Table 2.3: Does te mmate quality ↵ect early player perf rmance
outcomes?
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses;* indicates statistically significant at 5 per
cent level.
2.6.1 Impacts Early in Career
I first look at the impact of teammate quality on early career outcomes.
For the first and second year a key outcome is the minutes a player plays. Playing
more minutes is a sign of current e cacy but it can also have an important
developmental impact on a player. In the first 2 columns of table 2.3 the
dependent variable is the log of minutes played in the first year and the last two
columns show the analogous results for minutes played in the second year. In the
third and fourth column I show the impact of teammate quality on player
e ciency.
Table 2.3 shows that teammate quality does not a↵ect minutes played by
the player in his first year. A regression of log of minutes played yields negative
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coefficients on teammates at different positions, but the magnitudes are small and
not significant. Forwards and guards play significantly more minutes in the initial
stages of their career than do centers, though this is a fact that tends to be true
for veterans as well. In addition it also conforms to the general NBA philosophy of
drafting taller players (who typically play center) even if it takes a while for them
to develop- this may exacerbate the difference in minutes played across positions.
This is borne out in column 1 of table 2.3; guards and forwards play a significantly
higher number of minutes than centers in the first year of their career. Guards
play about ten more minutes a game than centers, which is the average difference
between a full-time starter and a reserve playing a significant role off the bench.
Minutes played in the second year follow a fairly similar pattern though the
difference between positions is less pronounced. Guards and forwards still play
more but the difference between guards and centers shrinks to about 4 minutes a
game. However the impact of teammates on minutes played continues to be
negligible.
Teammate quality has virtually no impact on player efficiency in the first
year of his career. The results for player performance closely mirror the result on
minutes played; player performance for guards and forwards is better in the first
year of their career, relative to centers.
2.6.2 Impacts in Final Rookie Contract Years
Table 2.4 shows the results of teammates’ impact on performance variables
in the third and fourth year of his career. The fourth year is also the last year that
a player is bound by the rookie scale contract. At the end of the fourth year,
players become free agents and are free to seek a contract on the open market.
Player performance in these years also seems largely unaffected by teammate
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Table 2.4: Does teammate quality affect player performance out-
comes in years 3 and 4?
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses;* indicates statistically significant at 5 per
cent level.
quality. Player efficiency rating have an average of about 15 so clearly the
magnitude of the effect of teammate quality is very small even if I ignore the fact
that the effects are statistically insignificant. A four point increase in teammate
quality can cause a change of one unit in the player’s year 3 efficiency rating. So
having an all-star teammate instead of an average one would reduce player
efficiency by about 1.5 units which is less than one half of a standard deviation.
The effect when I look at raw performance numbers in columns 5 and 6 is even
smaller.
As with the results in table 2.3, guards and forwards do better than centers.
This is likely an indicator of two simultaneously occurring effects. One is that the
level of failure among centers drafted is higher than that among players playing
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other positions. Teams place a premium on size and therefore may take more
chances when it comes to drafting centers. It may also be that the outcomes I
report in this table cast a less favorable light on center performance. If I had only
rebounds or blocked shots as an outcome, then clearly centers would do better.
Overall tables 3 and 4 show that peer effects on performance are largely
absent in the NBA. Performance variables in the first 4 years of a player’s career
do not seem to be impacted by quality of teammates, whether at their own
position or at the other positions. Additionally, I test for teammate quality being
jointly significant and are unable to reject the null that teammate impact is zero.
2.7 Wage Regressions
Ideally, in order to calculate peer effects on wages, I estimate salary as a
function of player quality and teammate quality. Since ‘true quality’ is unobserved
I proxy for it past performance.
I also include other player characteristics as controls, since performance has
an idiosyncratic component and may not perfectly account for ability. I use the
number at which a player was picked in the draft as an additional control for
player quality. While the draft ranking is merely an ordinal measure, it has the
benefit of being unaffected by current teammate quality and may also reflect
unobservable factors that impact the value of the player.
I also include other player characteristics such as position played by the
player. In addition salaries in the league grow over time so I include year dummies.
As before, in order to overcome potential endogeneity issues, I use the
quality of teammates in the year prior to the player joining the league as the
proxy for current teammate quality. In table 5 for each specification I report the
coefficient of 2 parallel regressions. The first column for each specification reports
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the result of using past teammate quality as a proxy for current teammate quality.
The second column for each specification reports a 2SLS variant with the same
explanatory variables.
The baseline equation that I estimate is
wi,t = α + βPER−i,t−5 + γPERi,t−1 + θRi,t−1 + λX + e
where w is the wage earned by the player i in time t. The 2 PER terms
measure player quality and teammate quality (−i). R is the raw performance
measure. Other control variables, X, include where the player was selected in the
draft and the position he plays.
For the second and third wage regressions I add other variables that could
impact wages. Playing in a market with a large TV audience may enable teams to
more easily afford the punitive payments for exceeding the salary cap. This is
captured with a dummy variable labeled ‘big market’. Teams can trade players
and being traded during the duration of the rookie contract is another control for
player quality. Being traded indicates that the player is not considered a franchise
cornerstone and may diminish his value. Lastly for specification 3 reported in the
last 2 columns of table 5, I include an additional control for whether the player
re-signs with the team that he played for in the final year of his rookie contract.
The NBA market is designed to give the incumbent team an advantage in
resigning their own players. If a player does not resign with his own team it may
shrink the market for his services considerably, to teams that are able to afford
him with salary cap constraints. It also increases the competition that the player
faces by expanding the pool of players he is competing with, for offers.
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2.7.1 Main Results
In this section I report my results for regressions on whether salary is
impacted by the quality of teammates. As discussed in the institutional setup
section, players are bound to their teams at a pre-determined rookie scale salary
for the first 4 years of their career. So the first point at which I can analyze the
possible impact of teammates on a player’s salary is by looking at his wages in the
5th year of his career.
Columns 1 and 2 show an estimate of the baseline wage regressions and we
add additional controls to our specification as we move across columns in the
table. It is perhaps most instructive to look at the results shown in column 6 of
the table. In column 6 of table 2.5 I see that the better the quality of the
teammate at the other positions the less salary a player receives. Every additional
unit increase in teammate efficiency leads to a 20 percent lower salary on average.
This implies that a center with an average guard would receive approximately
double the wages of a center playing with an all-star level, controlling for other
factors. This is clearly a substantial effect. I discuss some hypotheses that might
explain the effect in a subsequent section.
There may be salary cap issues that force players to accept lower wages I
include a control for whether a player’s team was over the salary cap (not
reported)- however the effect was small (negative) and statistically insignificant.
In practice it is hard to pin down the exact effect of salary cap because most
teams end up near or over the cap. In addition even during the season teams cap
situation may be different and this data is unavailable to us.
We see that players who re-sign with the same team that they played for in
their fourth year, make on average 70 percent more in wages. This is likely
partially explained by teams wanting to re-sign their better players and a desire
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for continuity on their roster. Rice and Sen (2008) show that there is team specific
capital formation in the NBA. This positive and large impact may also reflect the
realities of the NBA free agent market. Teams have a built in structural advantage
when it comes to re-signing their own players. These advantages include being
able to spend over the salary cap (while not having this luxury to use the same
amount of money to sign new players from outside the team) to re-sign their own
players and also having the right to match an outside offer. This means that
controlling for ability, players get a larger salary when they re-sign with a team
that own their ‘rights’ since they may face a much tighter market outside.
We lack the data to verify whether certain players take a slightly lower
salary in order to sign a guaranteed extension early and thus leave money on the
table (but have the certainty of an extension earlier as well).
Changing teams in the first 4 years of their career has no impact on player
salary, once I control for their performance.
2.7.2 Other Factors
The other factors affecting salary follow conventional wisdom. Playing
better in the 4th year of the career helps a player earn more. Every additional
point,rebound or assist earns a player an additional 8 percent in income. Thus a
player who averages twenty points is likely to receive close to double the wage
offers of someone averaging ten points, with all other metrics being the same.
Improving efficiency does not have a statistically significant impact once we
account for raw statistics.
The position that a player plays has a recurring theme. Traditionally teams
have always tended to value size. This leads them to both gamble by picking
centers with a limited record of prior success and pay a premium for productive
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ones. This shows up in our results as well where controlling for performance,
guards and forwards earn significantly less than centers.
2.7.3 Discussion of Results
The impact that high quality teammates have on a player’s salary is
noteworthy, especially since they do not seem to have a corresponding impact on
player performance. I run additional checks on the data and the effect persists.
The first possibility is that playing with better teammates may lead to more
compensation in other forms; potentially financial in the form of endorsements or
pleasure derived from team success. This view would suggest that a player
volunteers to take lower wages in order to play with better teammates. I have no
data to disprove this theory, though it is commonly believed most players tend to
prioritize getting the largest payout, especially early in their career. Taking a pay
cut to join a winning team is a phenomenon seen more commonly among older
players. A large chunk of endorsements are cornered by the top athletes, who are
generally not asked to take a paycut till much later in their career.
Players may take lower wages to play in favorable locations but playing in
a big market (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago) sees players making about 40
percent higher wages. Even in the presence of rules restricting team spending,
players playing in large markets are well compensated because these teams
generally have large additional revenues from local TV deals.
Another possibility is that the type of role that a player plays may change
in response to the quality of teammates around him. Having better teammates
may force a player into a more specialized role in order to complement the
incumbents on the team. This specialization may not impact the performance
metrics in our dataset but can drive his wages down. Teams could be pessimistic
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about the player’s ability to play a more well-rounded role or worry about how his
limited skills might translate to playing with less skilled teammates. With the
data currently available to me, I am unable to account for this possibility
explicitly in the regressions.
Also, the salary that a player gets offered depends greatly on the amount of
spending flexibility that teams have under the salary cap. Having better
teammates likely implies that teams already have a larger portion of their salary
cap invested in other players. This will reduce the player’s chances of receiving a
lucrative offer.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I use the NBA to analyze the impact of teammates on player
outcomes. The NBA draft and the institutional structure of the market for rookies
give me an assignment of players to teams that is ideal to analyze peer effects I
show that team choice in the draft is largely unaffected by positional need. This
suggests that the pick number of a player is a good control for player ability. We
show that the quality of players on a team the year before the player is drafted are
good proxies for actual teammate quality. We analyze how teammates affect a
variety of outcomes for players. These include minutes played in the first and
second year of a player’s career, efficiency rating in the first third and fourth year
and a raw measure of productivity in the fourth year I find that teammate quality
does not significantly affect any of these performance variables. Other factors that
I include as controls are position played by the player and the wins of the team in
the year before the player joined. Player salary in the fifth year of the player’s
career is negatively impacted by the quality of his teammates over the first four
years of his career. Using the quality of teammates in the year prior as a proxy
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shows that having an all-star as a teammate as opposed to an average player could
halve a player’s salary. This is confirmed by doing an IV analysis with the same
set of variables. I see that this negative impact is driven by having a higher
quality teammate at a different position. This suggests that teams inaccurately
attribute a player’s success to playing with a high quality teammate.
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CHAPTER THREE
Restricted Entry, Rookie Wages
and Unraveling in the NBA14
3.1 Introduction
There has been much commentary over the NBA continuing to get younger
and the increasing number of college freshmen and sophomores (and high school
graduates until the 2005 collective bargaining agreement led to a ban) entering the
NBA draft. Recent developments in collective bargaining have led to a situation
where players and teams have an incentive to contract early.
Periodically the Players’ Association and the League meet to negotiate the
‘rules of the game’ under which all entities will operate for the duration of the
agreement. In the past two negotiations, in 2005 and 2011 respectively, the NBA
has strongly advocated increasing the minimum age of entry for players wishing to
enter the draft. The NBA Players’ Association has resisted these attempts. In
2005 the NBA prevailed upon the Players’ Association to raise the draft age of the
players but not before offering some concessions.
At first glance the positions of the two sides seem counterintuitive. An
entrenched group of employees typically prefers to restrict entry while employers
prefer the opposite, since free entry pushes wages down. A closer examination of
the way NBA contracts are structured suggests an explanation for the owners’
position. Over 90 percent of the players entering the league do so via the NBA
draft. In the draft teams select players sequentially. Since 1994 NBA rookies have
been subject to a rookie scale contract structure (Groothuis et al (2007) describe
14This chapter is the product of joint work with Maria Kozhevnikova, of Ashenfelter and
Ashmore.
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in some detail the history of collective bargaining between the league and the
Players’ Association). This means that the initial salary a player receives in the
NBA is based purely on the number he was drafted at and is independent of
(expected) performance. This creates an opportunity for teams to capture large
rents from rookie players. Various observers of the NBA have concluded that
having a productive player on a rookie contract is the most valuable asset for an
NBA team.
The model we develop shows that under certain conditions the league can
obtain higher overall profits by raising the minimum age of entry to the league.
This happens even though the overall quality of talent in the league is diminished
by restricting entry. Our model shows that a situation with no restrictions can
lead to a type of ‘unraveling’ where a player is signed earlier rather than later.
This unraveling relies on two crucial elements drawn from the market for NBA
players, namely the existence of a rookie scale wage that limits how much rookies
can be paid and the fact that players improve over time.
In our model teams will draft first year players (our equivalent of players
with just a year of college experience) as long as their ability exceeds that of the
marginal older player. However this precludes teams from getting larger rents
from the player in subsequent periods because he is no longer eligible to be hired
at the rookie wage. Instead he will receive a higher market determined wage as a
‘veteran’.
3.1.1 Our Approach and Related Literature
In this paper we address the benefits the NBA might derive from
restricting entry to the league to players who meet a certain age minimum and
discuss the NBA’s effort to raise this age in collective bargaining. This falls
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broadly under the literature that addresses unraveling in the labor markets.
Unraveling can be defined as a situation in which employment or offer of
employment precedes attainment of the necessary professional qualifications.
While in most situations workers complete their qualification before joining a firm,
the majority of NBA players do not attain their degree. While the degree may be
of limited importance in the this context, it does mean that the cost of their
training and development must be borne by the teams rather than colleges.
Much of the unraveling literature deals with matching models. Li and
Rosen (1998) discuss a two-period framework where uncertainty over the
distribution of productivities may lead to early contracting. According to them,
unraveling serves as a form of insurance in the absence of complete markets but
may lead to inefficient assignments. Suen (2000) has a similar themed paper that
shows that early contracting can lead to inefficient matching. Li and Rosen cite
the phenomenon of NBA players increasingly entering the league at a younger age
as an important instance of unraveling. We agree and contend that the factor
driving this unraveling was the imposition of a rookie scale contract structure that
fixed rookie wages, as opposed to the incomplete markets postulated by Li and
Rosen. In our opinion it is no coincidence that the average age of entry started
declining soon after the rookie wage scale was imposed in 1994. Groothuis et al.
(2007) note that the average age of an NBA rookie declined from 22.3 in 1994 to
about 20.5 in 2004. In 2005 the NBA successfully negotiated an increase in the
minimum age of entry into the NBA. With a rookie wage in place teams are able
to get large rents from the hiring of rookies. This means that if young, talented
players enter the league they are drafted immediately. In our model a player’s
ability is known to both the players and teams, a departure from much of the
work described in this section.
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Roth and Xing (1994) have written an influential paper on the timing of
hiring in markets. Their paper contains a comprehensive description of the
multiple markets in which unraveling occurs as well as a classification of
unraveling. They discuss the causes of unraveling and how various players in the
labor markets deal with it. They analyze why attempts to mitigate or stop
unraveling have met with varying degrees of success. The matching of medical
students in the U.S. for example has been deemed successful while a similar
exercise in England was somewhat less so. Roth and Xing consider models in
which choices are made over time and allow for uncertainty about the workers’
qualifications as well as the uncertainty over whether a firm will be a good match
for a worker given his or her qualifications. They also discuss the mechanisms
designed to prevent unraveling, and whether such mechanisms are stable, i.e.,
persist over time.
There is a body of largely empirical work on the NBA, that focuses on how
various outcomes for players and teams are affected by restrictions on entry into
the league. Groothuis et al. (2007) argue that rookie scale contracts allow teams
to pay below market level wages to entering players and test empirical models that
show that players and teams may have an incentive to contract early. Early entry
lengthens careers of players and likely increases their career earnings. Sugai (2010)
finds that early entry has no long-term impact on player outcomes but in the short
run younger players play fewer minutes. Coates and Oguntimein (2010) show that
some measures of college productivity affect a player’s draft position and are also
predictors of his professional success. This suggests that forcing players to go to
college may have some informational contributions to the teams’ draft choices.
Any discussion of this issue is incomplete without a mention of the
coverage this issue has received in the popular press. Steve Kerr, a former NBA
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player and executive, published an article on the website Grantland.com that laid
out various reasons that the league preferred players to be older and have college
experience before heading to the NBA. According to Kerr, if players attend college
they become more polished and marketable products. This saves the teams the
cost of developing the players. The coach of the Kentucky University basketball
team, John Calipari has argued that the easiest way to prevent unraveling is for
the NBA to relax or abolish the rookie wage scale, an assessment that is consistent
with the findings of our model.
3.2 The Model
In our model there are two groups of agents - teams and players. Players
are assumed to live for three periods. Each player has an inherent type, x, drawn
from a continuous distribution f(x). Player type is known to all parties. A
player’s value to a team’s output in any given period, his productivity v, depends
on his type and age. In his first year a player’s productivity is equal to his type. A
player’s productivity grows by a proportion λ > 1 in the second year of his
existence and remains unchanged thereafter irrespective of his employment status
in period 1. So a player of type x has productivity (x, λx, λx) over the 3 years of
his life. We assume that a player has to be hired in year one or year two otherwise
he exits the market. Thus a player who is employed in his third year must be a
veteran, someone who had been hired in a prior period.
There are a total of n player vacancies every year, across all teams. While
we refer to n as the ‘total vacancies’, in our model n serves as the measure of
players selected from the 3 cohorts. So if the total mass of the 3 cohorts is 3 (one
for every year), n is the total out of those 3 that are employed. These vacancies
can be filled by players of any cohort i.e. the player can be in his first, second or
62
third year. We restrict our analysis to situations where n < 2. If n > 2, then
analyzing a regime with restrictions is less meaningful, since there will not be
enough players from the year 2 and year 3 cohorts (combined mass of 2) to fill all
vacancies.
Each team’s objective is to maximize total surplus from the players that it
hires. Surplus is defined as the player’s productivity in a given year less his wage.
3.2.1 Wage Determination
Wages are determined by the following rules. In a player’s first year of
employment, he gets a fixed ‘rookie wage’, wr, from the team that drafts him.
After a player completes his first period in the league he goes into a general pool
of experienced players and teams offer salaries for the second period based on his
productivity. Players who have been employed in a previous period, veterans, are
free to sign with the team that offers them the highest wage. Wages are
negotiated for every player after every period. For simplicity, we restrict our
analysis to contracts that span only one period. No players can be paid less than
wr. The outside option for players is assumed to be zero.
In the model we compare two regimes - one where teams can sign players in
their first year and one where players are only eligible to enter the market in year
2. If players can only enter in year 2, then all players from the year 2 cohort are
paid wr in that period.
In the conclusion we offer a brief discussion on how multi-period contracts
might affect our analysis.
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3.2.2 Equilibrium Description
The equilibrium is described by who gets hired and at what wage; wages
that a player receives will be a function of his type and experience level (which
together determine his productivity). It will be sufficient to calculate the marginal
(lowest) productivity of hired players as a function of experience. All players
above that marginal level will be hired while those below will not. Given that
teams and players live for multiple periods this is a dynamic model. However,
payoffs in each period are independent of other periods. Moreover new entrants in
the market ensure that the mix of players (in terms of productivity) is the same in
every period. Thus it is natural to focus on a steady-state equilibrium.
3.2.3 No Restrictions on Entry
We begin by introducing the model with no restrictions on entry. Players
of all 3 cohorts are eligible to be employed by teams. First year player
productivity lies in (0, xmax) while players from year 2 and year 3 lie in (0, λxmax).
We note at the outset that there are instances where n is small enough or λ is
large enough for no first year players to be hired, even in the absence of
restrictions. In such a scenario the equilibrium outcome of the market will be the
same as that of the market with restrictions. We explicitly derive equilibrium
conditions for this in a later section. For the purpose of the discussion in this
section we assume first year players are hired in equilibrium.
All players hired in their first year receive wr. Players employed in their
second year who were not hired in their first year also receive wr. Players with at
least a year of experience have their income constrained by (vm − wr) where vm is
the productivity of the marginal rookie and wr is the wage paid to him.
Let vj be the marginal productivity for players from cohort j that are
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employed in a given year, where j is either 1, 2 or 3. Note that the marginal
player from year 2 cohort would then be of type v2/λ (which is also his first year
productivity) . The surplus that a team receives from employing the marginal
rookie from the year 1 cohort is v1 − wr. This implicitly constrains the wages that
veterans can receive. In equilibrium, teams must earn at least v1 − wr from any
veterans that they hire.
The equilibrium will, as stated earlier, define the profile of players who get
hired and also the wages they receive. It is sufficient to define the marginal
productivity and a wage function that specifies veteran wages as a function of
productivity.
Between period one and period two players’ productivity is assumed to
increase by a factor λ > 1. There is no change in players’ productivity between
periods two and three. We find that the threshold marginal productivity vm is
equal across the three periods. From the year one cohort, teams will hire players
in the interval from vm to xmax. The proportion of first year players that get hired
as rookie players is equal to P (x ≥ vm) = (1− F (vm)), where F (x) is the
cumulative density function of player types.
Result 1
In equilibrium, if first year players are hired, then v1 = v2 = v3 = vm.
Proof By assumption the wage floor for veterans is set at wr. Suppose there
exists v3 > v1. Then teams can offer a wage of wr to the third-year player with
productivity v3 − e where e > 0 instead of the player with v1. The player will
accept this offer since it is greater than their outside option. A similar logic
applies to all v1, v2, v3.
Conversely suppose v1 > v3. Note that teams cannot offer a wage less than
wr to veterans implying that the maximum surplus the team gets from the marginal
year 3 veteran is v3 − wr. However there must exist e > 0 such that v1 − e > v3.
The team hiring the marginal veteran can instead offer the wage wr to a
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(potential) rookie with productivity v1 − e and get a higher surplus.
In general the wage of veterans is constrained by the surplus that the
marginal rookie generates for the team. But in a competitive environment wages
of veterans will be bid up to the maximum level making the ‘rookie wage’
constraint a binding one.
Corollary A veteran player with productivity v will receive an offer of
w = v − vm + wr
Proof Let us suppose instead that he is offered wa where wa = w + e and e > 0.
Then the surplus the team gets by hiring him is vm − wr − e. This is less than
what the team could obtain by simply hiring a marginal player from the year one
or year two cohort and paying him wr. Similarly if wa = w − e then a team that is
hiring the marginal player for wr is better served offering the player a slightly
higher wage, w − e/2 for instance, an offer that the player will accept.
Result 2
Employed rookies always include players from the year 2 cohort.
Proof From result 1 we know that v1 = v2 = v3 = vm when players are selected
from the year 1 cohort. However productivity grows by a proportion λ from year 1
to year 2. So there exists some x such that x < vm but λx > vm, since n < 2 and
consequently vm > 0. Players of this type enter in year 2. If no cohort 1 players
are selected then all rookies are from the year 2 cohort.
Players from the year 2 cohort can consist of both rookie players and
veterans (players hired in period 1). The change in productivity between periods 1
and 2 means that a player who had marginal productivity vm in period 1, now has
productivity λvm > vm. So everyone from the year 2 cohort with productivity
ranging from λvm to λxmax will be hired as a veteran. Rookies from this cohort
will have productivity ranging from a lower limit of vm to an upper limit of λvm.
From the year 3 cohort, teams will hire a player as long as his productivity is
greater than or equal to vm. All year 3 players are veterans.
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3.2.4 Equilibrium Calculations
We now turn to explicitly solving for the equilibrium of the model. The
aggregate surplus for teams is defined as the sum of player productivities less total
wages. We have four distinct categories of players who get hired in equilibrium.
1. Rookies from year 1 cohort.
2. Rookies from year 2 cohort.
3. Veterans from year 2 cohort.
4. Veterans from year 3 cohort.
We assume that xmax = 1 so that in year one x ∈ [0, 1] and productivity
shifts by a factor λ for the second year. The surplus of the teams has two distinct
components. There is the surplus that teams gain from hiring rookies and the
surplus gained from hiring veterans.
1. Surplus from rookies: Each rookie, regardless of age, gets paid the rookie
wage, wr. We know the marginal productivity from the year 1 cohort is vm. This
means that 1− F (vm) proportion of the year 1 population is hired as rookies. The
average productivity of year 1 rookies hired is 1∫vm xf(x)dx
1∫
vm
f(x)dx
 .
Year 2 rookies are those whose productivity was lower than vm in year 1 but
increases to above that by year 2 (see result 2). The proportion of these rookies as
a fraction of year 2 population is (F (vm)− F (vmλ )) and the average productivity is
vm∫
vm
λ
λxf(x)dx
vm∫
vm
λ
f(x)dx

2. Surplus from veterans: The salary a veteran receives is dependent on his
productivity level. In a competitive market with teams bidding for veterans, a
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player with productivity v will have his wages bid up to v   vm + wr, as we saw in
the corollary to result 1.
The corollary to result 1 implies that the surplus obtained by teams from
each veteran hire is vm   wr. Teams hire 1  F (vm) second year veterans and
1  F (vm/ ) third year veterans.
So the total surplus across all players hired is:
Sm = (1  F (vm))
0BBB@
1R
vm
xf(x)dx
1R
vm
f(x)dx
  wr
1CCCA + (F (vm)  F (vm  ))
0BBB@
vmR
vm
 
 xf(x)dx
vmR
vm
 
f(x)dx
  wr
1CCCA +
+(1  F (vm) + 1  F (vm
 
))(vm   wr)
To simplify we use a specific distribution for f(x). The type (productivity)
of players in year one has a uniform distribution over the unit interval x 2 [0, 1]
and productivity shifts by a factor   for subsequent years:
Sm =
1
2
+ 2vm + v
2
m
✓
 
2
  3
2 
  3
2
◆
  nwr
The total number of players hired over the three cohorts is equal to:
n = (1  F (vm)) + 2(1  F (vm
 
)) = 3  vm   2vm
 
and solving for vm
v⇤m =
(3  n) 
( + 2)
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Result 3
n > 2(λ− 1)/λ is a necessary and sufficient condition for rookies to be
hired in year 1.
Proof Recall that the maximum productivity of a first year player is 1. Since
vm < 1 if and only if n > 2(λ− 1)/λ the claim follows.
3.2.5 Restrictions on Entry
With restrictions on entry, players can enter the league in the second
period only. As a result, all second year players are rookies and all third year
players are veterans. Thus all second year players receive wr while veteran salaries
will be constrained as in the discussion earlier. Similarly v2 = v3 = vr where vr is
the marginal productivity under this regime. Additionally, this means that the
proportion of population hired from both the second year and the third year is the
same. The surplus will be equal to:
Sr = (1− F (vr/λ))

1∫
vr/λ
λxf(x)dx
1∫
vr/λ
f(x)dx
− wr
+
+(1− F (vr/λ))(vr − wr)
where the first expression is the surplus from rookies and the second
expression is from veterans whose wages are constrained by the marginal rookie
surplus.
Simplifying:
Sr =
λ
2
+ vr − v2r
(
3
2λ
)
− nwr
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The total number of players hired over two periods is:
n = 2(1− F (vr
λ
)) = 2(1− vr
λ
)
and solving for vr:
v∗r =
(2− n)λ
2
Result 4 For n > (2− 2/λ), vm > vr.
Proof This follows from the calculations of vm and vr.
This is the same restriction on λ that ensures first year rookies are hired in the
absence of restrictions. Clearly if no first year player is hired in equilibrium the
restriction is irrelevant, since the purpose of the restriction is to prevent
unraveling. In practical terms this means that the marginal productivity for all
‘interesting’ values of n and λ is higher when there are no restrictions imposed on
entry. Thus the quality of players in the league declines if restrictions are imposed
that prevent cohort 1 players from entering the league.
3.3 Comparing Regimes and Some Comparative Statics
In this section we compare average and marginal productivity levels under
the 2 potential regimes in more detail. In a subsequent section we will analyze the
surpluses accruing to teams and the wages being paid to players from different
cohorts. The focus of this paper is to compare a range of outcomes for players and
teams under the 2 regimes. We seek to motivate the NBA’s attempt to push for
age restrictions when it lowers productivity.
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3.3.1 Comparing Employment Patterns
We compare the proportions of veterans and rookies hired, across regimes.
When entry is restricted then the distribution of rookies is the same as the
distribution of veterans. Potential players from the year 2 and year 3 cohort have
productivities that lie in (0, λ). Thus using the result that v2 = v3, half the hires
are rookies and veterans constitute the other half.
The more interesting case comes when there is no restriction on entry.
Then assuming the conditions for vm < 1 are satisfied, the total number of rookies
hired (from year 1 and year 2 cohorts combined) is (1− vm/λ). The number of
veterans is 2− vm − vm/λ and outnumber the rookies since vm < 1.
Result 5 As λ increases, the overall proportion of rookies hired increases
for a given value of n. The proportion of first year rookies declines, but the
increase in second year rookies outweighs the decline of first year rookies.
Proof As λ increases so does vm. The total number of rookies hired from year 1
is 1− vm which clearly declines as vm goes up. Thus the proportion (number) of
year 1 rookies declines.
However since n remains unchanged it must be true that more players from
year 2 and 3 cohorts are hired. Since v2 = v3 we know that the number of hires
from the 2 cohorts is the same. So the hires from the year 2 cohort specifically go
up. But we know that the number of rookies in year 1 declines which means
players who are veterans in year 2 decline as well. This means the number of
rookies from year 2 must rise.
The total number of rookies is 1− vm from the year 1 cohort and
vm − (vm/λ) from the year 2 cohort. Cumulatively the number of rookies is
1− vm/λ. Substituting the expression for vm where v∗m = (3−n)λ(λ+2) we find that total
rookies hired is 1− (3− n)/(λ+ 2) which is increasing in λ.
What happens if the number of players getting hired increases? As n goes
up, the proportion of rookies declines for a given λ. As we increase the number of
71
total hires, marginal productivity level vm goes down. After that the logic is
analogous to the result above.
3.3.2 Comparing Productivity
As noted in result 4, for the values of n and λ that we consider,
vm − vr > 0. Does this difference rise or fall with changes in n and λ?
Unsurprisingly, given the results in the previous section, we find that the
difference between the marginal productivities in either regime shrinks as λ
increases. Similarly, if n increases the gap between vm and vr increases.
3.4 Players Association and Teams
3.4.1 Comparing Outcomes for Players
When comparing the two regimes the first thing to note is that with
restrictions, the maximum number of ‘earning’ periods a player can have is 2 as
compared to a maximum of 3. In addition, rules governing rookie wages decree
that a player must receive only wr in the first period of his employment regardless
of whether he is in a year 2 or year 3 cohort. Thus when we compare the lifetime
earnings of prospective players in the 2 settings, we are actually comparing 2
periods of market determined earnings in a non-restricted regime versus one
period of market wages in a restricted setting.
We first examine the case of high ability players who would be first year
rookies, were there no restrictions. These players are of type x, such that λx lies
in the interval (λvm, λ). Then the lifetime earnings of a player of this type are
wr + 2(λx− vm + wr). The lifetime earnings of the same player under restrictions
will be wr + (λx− vr + wr).
Thus when we compare the difference in lifetime earnings by subtracting
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the earnings under restriction from the earnings without restriction, we get
λx− 2vm + vr + wr.
We see that the lifetime earnings of higher quality players are higher
without restrictions. It also means that high quality players have more to lose if
their career is shortened by a year. As λ rises, λx rises at a faster rate than vm
and we know from a previous result that vm − vr shrinks. Thus as λ rises, these
players are more likely to resist restrictions on entry.
Among this same category of players of high enough type to be hired in
year 1, i.e with x > vm, there are combinations of λ and n where
x− 2vm + vr + wr < 0.
Player productivity in this case is close enough to the marginal level that
the benefit of getting 2 periods of market wages is less than the premium they
would get from one year of employment where the marginal player had a lower
productivity vr.
If second period productivity λx lies in the interval (vm, λvm), then the
player’s first year productivity x < vm. They would not be hired in the first year
and are first time hires in their second year. Their lifetime earnings are
wr + (λx− vm +wr). In a setting with restrictions, these players would be hired in
period 2 and have lifetime earnings of wr + (λx− vr + wr). We know for all
combinations of λ and n that vm − vr > 0. This means that lifetime earnings are
higher for 2nd year rookies in the restrictions regime rather than an unrestricted
regime.
Finally, when λx lies in (vr, vm) then these players would not be hired in
the regime with no restrictions. The fact that first year players are excluded from
employment gives these marginally talented players a chance to get hired and play
in the league. Clearly they benefit from these restrictions.
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Comment
It is difficult to say with certainty what changing the regime would do to
players who are already within the system since we only model a steady state
outcome. However the model clearly demonstrates that high ability players
(potentially stars) would be most opposed to restricting early entry. They lose a
year of being paid a high market determined wage. The middle class of players go
either way, depending on the values of the parameters. Losing a year of earnings
could be offset by the fact that these players gain a higher wage in their final year
because of getting a premium for being that much better than a marginal player.
For players who are already in the system, it is clear that this setup only
serves to increase wages if we move from no restrictions to restrictions. Having a
market with restricted entry forces the marginal productivity to fall making a
player with a given skill level relatively more valuable than he used to be.
This might explain to a certain extent why the Players’ Association agreed
to an increase in minimum age of entry in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of
2005 (along with gaining other concessions from the NBA). Restricting entry to
the NBA means more jobs and/or higher wages for those already within the
system.
3.4.2 Intuition Before We Compare Surpluses
This analysis is perhaps best motivated with a simple numerical example
that illustrates how the league’s preference for a specific entry regime might
depend on the particular parameter values. The parameters that we study are
how much players improve over time (λ) and the number of vacancies to fill (n).
We start with a baseline case where player productivity stays the same over
the 3 periods of his lifetime. This is a case where λ = 1. This means that player
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productivities for each cohort lie in the interval (0,1). For this example we assume
that n = 1.2. This translates to 40 percent of the total population of players being
hired in equilibrium (1.2/3). With these parameter values we find that the
marginal player in the no restrictions case has a productivity level vm = .6. With
restrictions on entry in place, there are only players from cohort 2 and 3 eligible to
be hired. In that case the marginal productivity vr = .4. Putting these values into
the surplus equation calculated in the previous sections we find that the teams do
better as a collective with no restrictions. Surplus is .67 compared to .55 in the
case with restrictions. This result is intuitive since there is no reason to restrict
entry if players do not improve over time.
Now let player productivity double from year 1 to year 2; i.e., let λ = 2.
Now the productivity of the year 2 cohort lies in the interval (0, 2). In this
scenario vm = .9 while vr=.8. Thus the difference in marginal productivity
shrinks. With this growth in productivity, the loss in quality from excluding the
most promising first year players is partially offset by the fact that the marginal
second year players come close to replicating their productivity. On the other
hand the rents that the teams obtain from getting high quality second year players
as rookies is comparatively large. In such a situation teams prefer to restrict entry.
When teams restrict entry, the marginal productivity (and the average
productivity) of players goes down. This is because, relatively productive first
year players, with productivities that lie between (vm, 1), are replaced with second
and third year players whose productivities lie between (vr, vm). Thus for teams to
push for restricting entry it must be that they gain on other aspects of player
contracts. Looking at the model it is easy to identify that channel; it is pushing
the rookie year of high player types to the second year where they have
experienced the λ growth in productivity from year 1 to year 2. Put simply teams
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now get a surplus of λx− wr from rookies where they earlier got x− wr.
However counteracting this is the fact that the surplus they get from the
marginal rookie goes down. For a given rookie wage rate wr, teams now gain a
surplus vr − wr compared to vm − wr without restrictions. This hurts teams’
surplus because as we show earlier, veteran wages are constrained by the surplus
that teams get from the marginal rookie. So a lower surplus translates to higher
wages for veterans.
3.4.3 Difference in Surpluses
We first formally calculate the difference in total surplus between the 2
regimes and then run a numerical simulation to make some assessments of how
surplus varies with regime under different values of the parameters. When
comparing the surpluses under the 2 regimes we start by noting that all terms
containing wr net out. By assumption, the rookie wage and number of players
hired is the same under either entry regime. So it is sufficient to compare only the
revenue component of each surplus equation.
Let Sm be the total surplus (net of wages) for teams under a ‘no
restriction’ entry regime. Let Sr be the surplus (net of wages) when players are
not allowed to enter in year 1 i.e they can only enter the league in year 2. We have
Sr≡ λ2 + vr − 32λv2r
Sm can be re-written as:
v2m(
λ
2
− 3
2λ
− 3
2
) + 2vm +
1
2
3.4.4 Analytical Solution
To compare surpluses in the intervals of interest, we recall that if
n < 2(λ− 1)/λ then vm > 1; the marginal player employed from the year 2 and
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year 3 cohorts has a productivity level higher than 1. This means that the
surpluses from the two entry regimes will be identical and no player of the year 1
cohort will be picked in equilibrium. Thus surpluses under the 2 regimes di↵er
only if n > 2(   1)/ , where vm and vr are di↵erent.
We have v2m =
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< 0 for n < 3 (and we assume n < 2).
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and
− (3−n)2
2
∂
∂λ
(
λ3−λ2−3λ
(λ+2)2
)
> 0 for λ > 1
Overall the impact of λ on the surplus difference depends on the actual parameter
values.
3.4.5 Numerical Simulation
Figure 3.1 shows an interesting pattern. For a given n, the surplus
difference gradually increases above 0 as we increase λ, then reaches a maximum
level and starts declining again. We look at a particular curve on the graph to
illustrate this effect. When we look at n = 1.5 (purple curve) we see that the
surplus difference is zero when λ = 2 (approx.), rises to about .07 when λ = 3 and
then declines back to zero by the time λ = 4.
The gradual increase is likely the impact of the teams getting higher
surplus from the rookies since they now get them in the second year. However
after a point with λ continuing to rise, the number of rookies who would have
been selected in year 1 shrinks to (potentially) inconsequential levels and the gain
from the higher surplus from rookies cannot outweigh the loss of surplus from the
entire class of veterans.
3.5 Further Analysis of Surplus Differences
The first solution when the surplus difference is equal to zero is
n = 2− 2/λ. This leads to vm = vr = 1. Recall from a previous section that we
need n > 2− 2/λ. Nevertheless this sets a useful lower bound for n as we compare
regimes.
78
Figure 3.1: Difference in surplus as a function of n and λ
3.5.1 Deriving Sufficient Conditions
The other solution when we set the surplus difference equal to zero is
n = (1/7)(18λ2 − 10λ− 8)/(λ2). Using the two results above in conjunction
enables us to describe sufficient conditions for the difference in surplus to be
greater than zero.
Result 6 For 2− 2/λ < n < (1/7)(18λ2 − 10λ− 8)/(λ2), teams generate a
larger surplus with restrictions on entry in place rather than unrestricted entry.
Thus teams prefer to restrict entry.
Proof By setting the surplus difference equation equal to zero we are able to solve
for n as a function of λ. These solutions described above set the bounds for values
of n where the surplus difference is positive. By numerical simulation we verify
that the surplus difference is greater than zero for all intermediate values of n (or
λ if we keep n fixed).
Figure 3.2 has a visual representation of the sufficient condition. The area
that lies between these curves (and a horizontal line where n = 2) represents all
combinations of n and λ such that it is better for teams to restrict player entry.
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Figure 3.2: Sufficient conditions for teams to prefer entry restrictions 
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Figure 3.2: Su cient conditions for teams to prefer entry restric-
tions
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Figure 3.3: Marginal productivity under regimes when surplus dif-
ference is zero
Comments on Marginal Productivities
In addition, we also show how vm and vr change with λ keeping the surplus
difference constant at zero. Note that as λ increases, the gap between vm and vr
must also increase. This is because teams profits from getting the higher
productivity players in year 2 as rookies is increasing. Therefore to offset this and
keep (the difference between) surplus at zero, the marginal productivity in a
non-restriction regime must be that much higher. This is depicted in figure 3.3.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that if a market has relatively standardized entry
level (or training) wages but where compensation can vary after the initial stages
of employment, unraveling is likely to occur. Employers are able to hire high
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ability new entrants at relatively low wages that are unconnected with the
employees’ true contributions. The surplus created by these wages causes firms to
hire these entrants at an earlier stage than is optimal because they fear
competitors poaching them. While we use the rookie scale wages in the NBA to
drive our model we are confident it can be adapted to other markets with similar
features.
In contrast with much of the literature on unraveling, we do not require
informational constraints to cause firms and employees to contract early. In our
model both players and teams have perfect information but the presence of a
rookie scale contract drives them to sign a contract as early as possible. The
model assumes that players would improve their skill levels over time, irrespective
of when they enter the NBA.
We touch briefly on the possibility of multi-period contracts. In this model
players have perfect knowledge of their future abilities and earning potential.
Thus there is no incentive for them or teams to sign multi-period contracts.
However in a scenario where teams have the inside track on being able to re-sign
players that they drafted, the tendency for the market to unravel might even be
more pronounced.
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Appendix
A.1 Appendix Section 1
A.1 Derivation of optimal effort:
The optimal levels of effort arise through the derivation of equilibrium
conditions (1.1),
eM1 =
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂e11
+
R
2
∂Ey1e
M
2 (y1)
∂e11
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2e
M
3 (y1)
∂e11
eM2 (y1) =
R
2
∂Ey2U3
∂eM2
+
R
2
∂Ey2e
M
3 (y1, y2)
∂eM2
eM3 (y1, y2) = 0.
The change in expected third-period utility due to a marginal change in
second-period effort is
∂Ey2U3
∂eM2
=
∂
∂eM2
Ey2
(
− 1
α
exp[−ακ1y3(y1, y2)]
)
(A.1)
=
∂
∂eM2
Ey2
(
− 1
α
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − eM∗1 + y2 − eM∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ eM∗3
)])
= Ey2
∂
∂e12
(
− 1
α
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − eM∗1 + y2 − eM∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ eM∗3
)])
= Ey2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − eM∗1 + y2 − eM∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ eM∗3
)])
Using equation (A.1) and the equilibrium conditions on effort beliefs (et = e
∗
t in all
periods), optimal second-period effort reported in equation (1.3) follows. Using
similar processes, we can derive optimal effort in the first period of a multi-period
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contract (eM∗1 ), and first and second-period effort in the case of multiple
single-period contracts (eS∗1 , and e
S∗
2 ).
A.2 Proof for Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (Expected) within-contract effort is increasing.
Proof. Equations (1.3) and (1.2) show that the first-order conditions for
eM1 and e
M
2 are
eM∗1 =
R2
2
Ey1,y2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
eM∗2 (z¯2) =
R
2
Ey2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
Because the decision to extend or not must come at the start of the game
(i.e., before period 1), both the principal and agent are interested in period 1
expectations of second-period effort, Ey1,y2(e
M∗
2 ). Comparing the first-order
condition for e1∗2 , (1.3), above to the equation for Ey2U3,
Ey2U3 = Ey2
(
− 1
α
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − e1∗1 + y2 − e1∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ e1∗3
)])
,
we can see that eM∗2 =
R
2
∂Ey2U3
∂eM2
= R
2
−ακ1hz
(ha+2hz)
Ey2U3 = cEy2U3 with c representing the
constant term, R
2
−ακ1hz
(ha+2hz)
, and in which we apply all equilibrium conditions within
expected utilities (i.e., e = e∗ in all periods). Likewise, the first order condition for
eM∗1 =
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂eM1
= RcEy1,y2U3. Taking first-period expectations on second-period
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effort implies
Ey1,y2(e
M∗
2 ) = Ey1,y2(cEy2U3) (A.2)
= cEy1,y2(Ey2U3)
= cEy1,y2U3
=
1
R
eM∗1 .
Moving from the second to third equality requires invoking the law of iterated
expectations. Since R < 1, we conclude that expected within contract effort is
increasing as we move towards the termination date.
A.3 Proof for Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 First-period effort under a single-period contract is greater
than first-period effort under a multi-period contract; eS∗1 ≥ eM∗1 .
Proof. The first-order condition for eS1 , we see that
eS∗1 =
R
2
∂Ey1,y2U2
∂e21
+
R
2
∂Ey1e
S
2 (y1)
∂e21
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂e21
+
R2
2
∂Ey1,y2e
S
3 (y1, y2)
∂e21
.
As above,
∂Ey1,y2U3
∂eS1
= Ey1,y2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − eS∗1 + y2 − eS∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ eS∗3
)])
.
(A.3)
Using (A.3) and applying the equilibrium conditions that eS1 = e
S∗
1 , e
S
2 = e
S∗
2 , and
eS3 = e
S∗
3 = 0, the first-order condition for first-period effort becomes
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2
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∂e21
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R2
2
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κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
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ha + 2hz
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R
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∂e21
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This implies
eS∗1 − eM∗1 =
R
2
∂Ey1,y2U2
∂eS1
=
R
2
∂
∂eS1
Ey1,y2
(
− 1
α
exp
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κ1hz
ha + hz
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(
exp
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µha + hz(y1 − eS∗1 )
ha + hz
+ eS∗2
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> 0.
The last term is true since a positive constant multiplies an exponential function,
which is always positive.
Proof for Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 Effort in the second period of the agent’s life is the same
regardless of whether the agent is in a one-period contract or in the second period
of a two-period contract; e1∗2 = e
2∗
2 .
Proof. Using the procedure outlined in Case 1, the change in expected
third-period utility due to a marginal adjustment in second-period effort is a
modified version of equation (A.1)
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∂Ey2U3
∂eS2
= E y2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(y1 − eS∗1 + y2 − eS∗2 )
ha + 2hz
+ eS∗3
)])
.
(A.4)
After applying all equilibrium conditions, the first-order condition for
second-period effort is
eS∗2 (y1) =
R
2
Ey2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
which is equal to eM∗2 by (1.3).
A.1.1 Looking for Closed Form Solution
To find a closed-form solution for effort to be used in the numerical
simulation, we must first integrate over a series of random variables. In what
follows we give an example of how we avoid some of the complications involved
with multiple integration.
Using equation (1.2),
eM∗1 =
R2
2
Ey1,y2
(
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz(z¯1 + z¯2)
ha + 2hz
)])
.
we can now explicitly solve for the first-order condition for first-period effort.
Because we must take expectations over 2 periods of outcomes (net of
effort), we must integrate over 3 random variables. Let J1 be a new random
variable, defined as the combination of all three so that J1
= 2a+ z1 + z2 ∼ N(2µ, 4σ2a + 2σ2z). We now need only to take expectations over J1
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eM∗1 =
R2
2
∫
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hzJ1
ha + 2hz
)]
f(J1)dJ1.
Splitting the random variable from the rest,
eM∗1 =
R2
2
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha
ha + 2hz
)]∫
exp [t · J1] f(J1)dJ1
in which we define t = −ακ1hz
ha+2hz
. Finally, note that the integral term is the moment
generating function for a random variable, J1. Namely, since J1 is a normally
distributed random variable with mean 2µ and variance 4σ2a + 2σ
2
z , MJ1(t) =
E(exp[tJ1]) =
∫
exp [tJ1] f(J1)dJ1 = exp[2µt+
t2
2
(4σ2a + 2σ
2
z)]. By rejoining the
terms under one exponential function we get
eM∗1 =
R2
2
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
[
−ακ1
(
µha + hz (2µ+ t(2σ
2
a + σ
2
z))
ha + 2hz
)]
.
We can mimic this procedure to find that a closed-form solution for
optimal second-period effort is
eM∗2 (y1) =
R
2
κ1hz
ha + 2hz
exp
−ακ1
µha + hz(z¯1 + haµ+hz z¯1ha+2hz + t2
(
1
ha+hz
+ σ2z
)
ha + 2hz
 .
We can do the same for effort under a series of 1-period contracts so that
we have straight-forward equations for effort which depend only on the underlying
parameters.
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